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Since the mid-1990s, market services have positively influenced labor productivity
growth in the US, but not in most European countries. We analyze these cross-
country differences in growth dynamics using industry-level measures of  output,
inputs, and multifactor productivity (MFP) from the new EU KLEMS database.
We find that using detailed data has important implications for empirical analysis
of  policy influences on growth. Increased investment in information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) capital and growth in human capital contributed
substantially to labor productivity growth in market services across all European
countries and the US. However, countries differ most strongly in the rates of  effi-
ciency improvement in the use of  inputs. We find no evidence of  an externality-
driven relationship between such efficiency changes and the growth of  ICT use or
of  employment of  university-educated workers. We also find that entry liberalization
has been beneficial for productivity growth in telecommunications, but not in other
service industries.
— Robert Inklaar, Marcel P. Timmer and Bart van Ark
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Market services productivity 
across Europe and the US
 
Robert Inklaar, Marcel P. Timmer and Bart van Ark
 




Labor productivity growth in the European Union has been substantially slower than
in the United States since the mid-1990s. The prospects for Europe to become the
most dynamic region of  the world in the near future, as established in the Lisbon
Agenda, therefore seem to be dim. Table 1 summarizes labor productivity growth
across Europe and the US. Even though productivity growth slowed down for the





 Countries like Austria, Finland and the UK showed much
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The EU-15 refers to all member states before the May 2004 Accession Round. In this paper we do not address the
performance of  the ten new member states, even though those are part of  the EU KLEMS database. Also, in the remainder of
the paper we exclude five EU-15 countries from our analysis, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. The
latter countries had to be excluded from the measures of  capital and MFP in this paper, because series adequate for growth
accounting at the industry level are still missing for the whole of  the period 1980–2004. In 2005, these 10 European countries
made up 92% of  GDP in the EU-15 and 83% of  GDP in the EU-25.
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better performance than laggard countries such as Italy and Spain. This raises the
broader question of  what is driving cross-country differences in productivity growth.
By now, it is well known that market services have been the major driver of  strong
US labor productivity growth since the 1990s (Triplett and Bosworth, 2004) and
these industries are at the heart of  the labor productivity growth differences between




, 2003, 2008; Blanchard, 2004). A largely




 labor productivity growth in market services has
differed across Europe and the US.
The main sources of  labor productivity growth are investment in physical and
human capital and gains in efficiency, also referred to as multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth. In this paper, we will provide a detailed accounting of  the importance
of  these sources of  labor productivity growth in service industries. For this purpose
we make use of  the recent release of  the EU KLEMS database, which provides a
comprehensive overview of  output, inputs and productivity at the industry level for a




 Our focus on market services should




The EU KLEMS database is the product of  a joint research project, funded by the European Commission, Research
Directorate General, in which the Groningen Growth and Development Centre at the University of  Groningen is one of  the
key collaborators. The empirical work in this paper is mostly based on the database released in March 2007, which is freely





Table 1. Growth rates of  GDP per hour worked in European countries and the 
US, 1980–2006 (average annual growth in %)
 1980–1995 1995–2006
EU-15 2.3 1.4















United Kingdom 2.6 2.0
Average of  15 EU countries 2.3 1.8
Standard deviation 0.7 1.0
Notes: Countries that were members of  EU-15 before 1 May 2004.
Source: GGDC/TCB Total Economy Database, January 2007, www.ggdc.net
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substantial source of  growth, but also because services are amongst the most intensive
users of  new technologies (in particular ICT) and skilled labor. This puts the develop-
ments in market services at the heart of  the Lisbon Agenda aimed at creating a
dynamic knowledge-based economy, and deserving of  further study. If  it is true that
the growth effects of  investment in skills and ICT differ strongly across countries, this
should show up most clearly in a study of  market services.
After analyzing the sources of  labor productivity growth, we undertake an analysis
of  factors driving technological change and efficiency gains. Aghion and Howitt
(2006) suggest that the post-World War II catch-up of  European economies to the US
has slowed down recently as the technology gap with the US has narrowed. Policies
and institutions which facilitated imitation of  technologies in the past are not well
suited for growth close to the technology frontier. The latter should be based on
innovation in a competitive market environment, rooted in a country’s own resources
such as skilled labor and research and development. The growth-policy recommen-




, 2004) are in large part based on this line of
argument, supported by two key empirical studies. First, Vandenbussche, Aghion and
Méghir (2006) show that economies with more university-educated workers show
faster MFP growth, in particular when they are close to the technology frontier.
Second, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show that lowering entry barriers stimulates
MFP growth. However, their findings are mostly limited to manufacturing industries,
which begs the question whether such effects can also be found in market services.
This is all the more important since many of  the most highly regulated industries
today are in market services (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006) and because many of  the
policy initiatives for regulatory reform focus on opening up of  services markets, in
particular the EU Services Directive.
The main contribution of  this paper is that we address these issues using the new
EU KLEMS database. This database contains novel measures of  the skill distribution
of  the workforce and the composition of  investment. It makes it possible to accurately
measure and analyze the role of  high-skilled labor and investment in ICT-capital for
labor productivity growth at a detailed industry level. In Section 2, we show that
growth differences in market services closely mirror aggregate growth differences
across countries. We find that the use of  ICT and university-educated workers
contributes substantially to labor productivity growth in market services in all European
countries and in the US. However, most of  the cross-country growth differences are
not due to differences in the pace of  investment in ICT and human capital. Instead,
differences in efficiency gains are the key factor in cross-country differences in labor
productivity growth in market services (Section 3). We cannot find any evidence of
externalities to the use of  ICT and university-educated workers which might explain
differences in efficiency gains across countries. As such, our results regarding the




(2006). We show that this can be traced to the use of  more sophisticated productivity
data and our industry-level focus. Furthermore, we find that lower regulatory barriers
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to entry in post and telecommunications have stimulated MFP growth which extends
the findings by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) to the services sector. This illustrates
the importance of  a detailed industry focus. It also provides support for further
liberalization, not only within countries, but also across borders as envisaged in the
EU Services Directive. However, although our evidence is suggestive of  a role for
product market liberalization to improve market services productivity growth, it must
be treated with caution as we do not find similar supportive evidence for other
services industries. Section 5 concludes.
 
2. MARKET SERVICES AND AGGREGATE GROWTH
 
Ever since the work by Baumol and Bowen (1966) on the cost disease hypothesis in
cultural arts, economic growth in advanced countries is presumed to suffer from slow
productivity growth in services. In essence, Baumol’s cost disease states that produc-
tivity improvements in services are less likely than in the goods-producing industries
because many services are inherently labor-intensive, which makes it difficult to sub-
stitute labor for capital (Baumol, 1967). As services make up an increasing share of
the economy as countries grow richer, a decline in aggregate productivity growth
would be inevitable. It turns out, however, that the cost disease hypothesis no longer
has much validity at least for the market services sector in the United States, which
broadly includes trade, transportation, communication, financial, business and per-
sonal services. While the share of  market services in the US increased from 37 to 44%
between 1980 and 2004, labor productivity growth accelerated from 1.4% from




 In a seminal study looking in
detail at the productivity performance of  individual service industries in the US,
Triplett and Bosworth (2006) show that since 1995, 15 out of  22 two-digit services
industries experienced an acceleration in labor productivity that at least equalled the
economy-wide average. Hence the authors titled their study ‘Baumol’s Disease has
been cured.’ Most European countries, however, still seem to suffer from Baumol’s
disease. While the share of  market services in nominal GDP in Europe has been
steadily increasing from on average 34% of  GDP in 1980 to 41% in 2004, labor





 Only the Netherlands and the UK recorded accelerating productivity
growth in market services after 1995 (see Table 2).
Before proceeding we need to provide a more precise measure of  the importance




Market services as defined in this study include nine industries, see Appendix Table 1 for precise definitions. The increase in
the GDP share of  market services is the result of  a number of  interacting forces (Schettkat and Yokarini, 2006). First, a high
income elasticity for services and an increase in per capita income lead to higher demand for services in general. In addition,
there is an increasing marketization of  traditional household production activities (Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). Finally, there




As indicated in footnote 1, the EU-average in the remainder of  this paper relates to 10 of  the 15 EU countries, excluding
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden.
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The contributions of  market services to aggregate labor productivity can be calculated
using a shift-share approach. Following this approach the contribution of  an industry
to aggregate productivity growth is measured by weighting its labor productivity
growth rate by its share in aggregate value added. Figure 1 summarizes the relative
contributions of  market services and the other industries (including manufacturing,
mining, utilities and agriculture) to labor productivity growth in the market economy




 The countries are ranked according to
total market economy productivity growth ranging from the highest growth rate in




 It appears that the divergence in market
economy productivity growth is mainly due to differences in the contribution of
market services, which is highest in fast-growing economies such as Finland, the US,
the Netherlands and the UK, and close to zero in Germany, Italy and Spain. This
confirms the results from recent studies for the US by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh
(2005) and Bosworth and Triplett (2007) which indicate that market services are the
most important driver of  the American growth resurgence. The differentiating role




Market economy excludes health (ISIC industry N), education (ISIC M), private households with employed persons (ISIC P)
and government sectors (ISIC L). We also exclude real estate (ISIC 70), because output in this industry mostly reflects imputed
housing rents rather than sales of  firms. The measurement problems in the public services are more substantial than in market
services, and in several cases (in particular for government) the output growth is measured using input growth. Still, labor
productivity growth measures for non-market services tend to be somewhat higher for the EU than for the US, so that the
market economy productivity measures show an even larger gap between the EU and the US since 1995 and in particular since




Strong productivity growth in other industries in Finland is driven primarily by growth in IT-goods production (Daveri and
Silva, 2004). Other countries covered in this study have a much smaller IT-producing sector.
Table 2. Share in GDP and average annual labor productivity growth in 
European countries and the US, market services, 1980–2004 (%)
 
 
Share of  market services 
in GDP (%)
Growth of  value added per 
hour worked
1980 1995 2004 1980–1995 1995–2004
Austria 37 40 43 2.1 0.7
Belgium 32 40 44 1.4 1.2
Denmark 34 38 40 3.0 0.9
Finland 30 34 36 2.5 1.7
France 36 38 41 1.9 1.3
Germany 32 38 40 2.3 0.8
Italy 36 40 42 0.6 0.3
Netherlands 34 42 46 0.3 2.4
Spain 31 38 41 1.0 0.4
UK 33 41 49 1.9 2.5
US 37 41 44 1.4 3.3
Average 34 39 42 1.7 1.4
Standard deviation 2.4 2.2 3.3 0.8 1.0
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in Timmer et al. (2007).
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between Europe and the United States (O’Mahony and van Ark, 2003; Losch, 2006;
Inklaar, Timmer and van Ark, 2007).
A more in-depth focus on the market services sector reveals that growth differences
are particularly large in retail and wholesale trade and financial services. This raises
the question to what extent the differences in performance across Europe are a
statistical artefact due to differences in measurement methods by national statistical
institutes, as for example suggested in a report of  the European Commission (2004).
Based on a survey of  the current state of  services output measurement practices we
conclude that for many market service industries, output measures in the National
Accounts should give a fairly accurate – albeit not perfect – internationally compa-
rable picture of  developments (see discussion in Appendix 1).
 
3. THE GROWING ROLE OF SKILLS AND ICT-CAPITAL IN GROWTH
 
It has often been stated that growth in today’s knowledge economy is strongly driven
by an increasing use of  skills and ICT-capital in the so-called knowledge economy. In
this section we use a growth accounting methodology to measure the relative
contributions of  various capital assets and labor types to growth in market services.
Section 3.1 introduces the basic data source for this paper, the EU KLEMS database.
In Section 3.2 we discuss recent trends in investment in ICT and non-ICT assets in
Figure 1. Contribution of  market services (dark) and other industries (light) to 
market economy labor productivity growth in Europe and US, 1995–2004
Notes: Following Stiroh (2002) aggregate labor productivity growth can be written as:
 where VA and H denote gross value added
and hours worked respectively, and  is the two-period average share of  industry i in aggregate value added.
The contribution of  an industry to aggregate productivity growth is measured by weighting its labor productivity
growth rate by its share in aggregate value added. The term in brackets is the reallocation of  hours. It reflects
differences in the share of  an industry in aggregate value added and its share in aggregate hours worked. The
reallocation term is positive if  employment shifts from low productivity industries towards high productivity
industries. ‘other industries’ also includes the reallocation-term.
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market services across Europe and the US. This is followed by an analysis of  the
developments in the use of  skilled labor over the past decades (Section 3.3). Based on
these input measures, a decomposition of  labor productivity growth in market
services is provided in Section 3.4. We show that investment in ICT and the use of  skilled
labor are important drivers of  labor productivity growth in all countries. On average,








 across countries in labor productivity growth. This suggests that the fastest
growers are particularly characterised by their more efficient use of  inputs as measured
by multifactor productivity (MFP). The determinants of  MFP growth are analysed in
more detail in Section 4.
 
3.1. EU KLEMS database and growth accounting methodology
 





database has been constructed with the explicit aim of  providing internationally
comparable series on output, inputs and productivity by industry within a consistent
framework for a large set of  European countries and the United States. In this
database, various sets of  inputs are distinguished: capital (K), labor (L), Energy (E),
Materials (M) and Services (S). Accurate measures of  labor and capital input
contributions to growth are based on a breakdown of  aggregate hours worked and
aggregate capital stock into various components. Hours worked are cross-classified by
educational attainment, gender and age (to proxy for work experience) into 18 labor
categories to account for differences in the productivity of  various labor types, such
as high- versus low-skilled labor. Thus labor input measures in EU KLEMS take
account of  changes in the skill-level of  the labor force. Similarly, capital stock
measures are broken down into different asset types to study the impact of  the
increasing use of  ICT assets. We make a distinction between three ICT assets (office
and computing equipment, communication equipment and software) and three non-





The EU KLEMS database provides a long time-series going back to 1970 through
linking of  National Accounts data series from different release vintages. National
Accounts series are further subdivided into the industry, labor and capital detail on
the basis of  additional secondary data sources. For example, industry detail for output
and labor input (employment and hours) series is obtained from industry surveys. For
a breakdown of  various labor categories, additional sources are used, such as Labour












Residential capital is excluded from the analysis here to focus on assets in the market economy. Investment in residential
buildings is almost exclusively concentrated in the real estate industry, which is excluded in this study.
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series on investment particularly in computers and communication equipment are
normally not provided in the National Accounts, so that a breakdown of  investment
into various asset types was done using additional information from input–output
tables and investment surveys. Further details on the sources and methods used for





To assess the contribution of  the various inputs to aggregate growth, we apply the
growth accounting framework as developed by Jorgenson and associates (see, for
example, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005). For the purpose of  this paper we will
decompose the growth of  labor productivity (value added per hour worked) into the
contribution of  ICT capital services, non-ICT capital services, labor services and
multifactor productivity (see Box 1). The growth contribution of  each input is calcu-
lated as the growth rate of  the input per hour worked multiplied by the share of  the
input in value added (see Appendix 2 for a more formal description).
 
Box 1. What does multifactor productivity growth measure?
 
Multifactor productivity (MFP) growth is measured as the difference between
the volume growth of  outputs and the volume growth of  inputs. As such, it
captures increases in the amount of  output that can be produced by a given
quantity of  inputs. Put alternatively, it captures the reduction in input costs to
produce a given amount of  output. Many factors may cause changes in MFP
growth. Under strict neo-classical assumptions, MFP growth measures disembodied
technological change. In practice, measured MFP includes a range of  other
effects. First, in addition to technical innovation it also includes the effects from
organizational and institutional change. For example, the successful reorganization
of  a business to streamline the production process will lead to higher MFP growth.
Second, MFP also captures changes in returns to scale. For example, there is
some evidence that scale is important for realising productivity growth in retail
trade, possibly because of  the large outlays required for modern inventory
management systems. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) show that much
of  US productivity growth in retail trade is due to the spread of  national
chains. If  a firm originally operates below its minimum efficient scale, increas-
ing production will lead to an increase in measured MFP. Third, MFP meas-
ures pick up any deviations from the neo-classical assumption that marginal
costs reflect marginal revenues. If, on the one hand, there are externalities
related to investments in ICT in network industries this will increase MFP. On
the other hand, when ICT investments have been driven more by herd-behavior
than by economic fundamentals, MFP is underestimated and the contributions
of  ICT investment to growth are overestimated. Fourth, being a residual measure,
MFP growth also includes the effects from unmeasured inputs, such as research
and development and other intangible investments. Finally, MFP includes
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measurement errors, such as mismeasurement of  the quality change of  new
services products, or of  high-tech inputs. We partly address this problem by
using deflators for IT-investment that correct for quality change. In Appendix 1 we
discuss the – in our view – limited degree of  mismeasurement of  services output.
In this paper we use MFP measured at the industry-level, not at the firm-
level. Importantly, industry-level MFP reflects not only the average change in
MFP of  each firm within the industry, but also includes the effects of  reallocation
of  market shares across firms. For example, MFP growth in a particular industry
might increase through a shake out of  the least productive firms, for example,
because of  increased competitive pressure after liberalizing domestic markets.
Similarly the privatization of  public firms might lead to a reduction in input
use. It should be stressed that all effects on measured MFP discussed here can
be broadly summarized as ‘improvements in efficiency’, as they improve the
productivity with which inputs are being used within the industry. See Hulten
(2001) for a more extensive discussion of  the MFP concept.
 
3.2. The role of investment in ICT and non-ICT capital
 
The availability of  investment series by asset type and by industry is one of  the unique
characteristics of  the EU KLEMS database, allowing for a detailed analysis of
investment in specific types of  assets by individual industry. In Table 3 we provide the
Table 3. Investment-to-value-added ratios for ICT- and non-ICT capital, market 
services in Europe and the US, averages over 1980–1995 and 1995–2004
 1980–1995 1995–2004
ICT Non-ICT ICT Non-ICT
Austria 3.6 16.8 4.2 15.9
Belgium n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Denmark 5.8 15.1 6.2 16.2
Finland 4.2 19.6 5.2 11.8
France 2.9 12.8 4.1 12.0
Germany 2.8 11.6 3.9 14.0
Italy 3.3 19.4 3.4 18.4
Netherlands 3.8 13.4 4.8 11.6
Spain 4.4 11.5 4.5 15.3
UK 4.0 14.9 6.6 13.0
US 4.2 9.9 5.9 8.6
Average 3.9 14.5 4.9 13.7
Standard deviation 0.9 3.3 1.1 2.8
Notes: Ratios of  nominal gross fixed capital formation over nominal value added in market services. The figures
for Germany 1980–1995 refer to West Germany 1980–1991. Figures for Italy exclude business services (ISIC
71–74).
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in Timmer et al. (2007).
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shares of  investment expenditure in gross value added in market services for each
country. The trend of  increasing investment in ICT capital in market services stands
out clearly. On average, over all countries, the ICT investment to value added ratio
increased from 3.9% during 1980–1995 to 4.9% during 1995–2004. The latter
period includes the ICT investment boom in the run-up to the millennium as well as
the post-2000 bust. Strikingly, ICT investment rates in 2004 are back to the levels of
the beginning of  the 1990s, suggesting that expenditures on ICT assets have become
a routine and stable part of  firms’ strategies. It should be stressed though that expenditures
on non-ICT assets are still at least double or triple the outlays for ICT assets. Even
in market services, which are the most intensive users of  ICT, investment in non-ICT
related equipment and non-residential structures are still dominant. Table 3 also
shows that there is a substantial variation in investment rates across countries. For
example, ICT investment rates are the highest in Denmark, Netherlands, UK and
the US in the period 1995–2004 but much lower in large continental European
countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Investment in traditional (non-
ICT) assets is highest in Austria, Denmark and Spain. This raises the question to
what extent differences in investment rates can explain differences in labor productivity
growth rates.
To answer this question one has to transform the investment flows into a measure
of  capital services. Capital services measure the flow of  services of  the capital stock
which is being used during a particular period of  time. To measure capital services
on the basis of  investment series, a number of  procedural steps have to be taken. First,
nominal investment series are deflated and accumulated into stock estimates using
the Perpetual Inventory Method (see Appendix 2 for details). The deflators for IT-
hardware reflect the rapid changes in quality (see Box 2 on ICT investment deflators).
The capital stocks for the different assets are then aggregated on the basis of  the user
cost of  each asset to form capital service flows.
The user cost approach is crucial for the analysis of  the contribution of  capital to
output growth. It was introduced by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and is based on
the assumption that marginal costs reflect marginal productivity. A simple example
may illustrate this approach. Suppose that a firm uses a computer and a building for
one year. If  the annual costs of  using one euro of  computers is higher than the cost
of  using one euro of  buildings, computers have a higher marginal productivity, and
this should be accounted for. There are various reasons why the cost of  computers is
higher than for buildings. While computers may typically be scrapped after five or
six years, buildings may provide services for several decades. Besides, prices of  new
computers are rapidly declining while those of  buildings do not in normal circum-
stances. This decline in value of  computers entails a cost. Typically, the user cost of
computers is 50 to 60% of  the investment price, while that of  buildings is less than
10%. Therefore the growth in the computer capital stock gets a heavier weight in
calculating capital services than the growth in the building stock. Appendix 2 explains
the derivation of  the capital services estimates in more detail.
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Box 2. ICT investment deflators
 
To transform the nominal investment series into volumes, price deflators for
each asset type are needed. Price measurement for ICT assets has been an
important research topic in recent years, as the quality of  those capital goods
has been rapidly increasing. Until recently, large differences existed in the
methodology to obtain deflators for ICT equipment between countries, and
the use of  a single harmonized deflator across countries was widely advocated
and used (Schreyer, 2002; Colecchia and Schreyer, 2002; Timmer and van Ark,
2005). This deflator was based on the US deflators for computer hardware,
which were commonly seen as the most advanced in terms of  accounting for
quality changes using hedonic pricing techniques (Triplett, 2006). However, in
recent years, many European countries, such as France, Germany, Netherlands
and the UK have made significant progress in either developing and implementing
their own quality-adjusted deflators for IT equipment, using high-frequency
matched models or hedonic-type deflators, or by using deflators based on
adapted price indices from the US Bureau of  Economic Analysis. These new
deflators typically show price declines of  about 10% annually. For those
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain and Italy) which have not
implemented a quality-adjusted investment deflator for computers yet, we
continued to use the harmonization procedure suggested by Schreyer (2002).
In Table 4 the contributions of  the increase in capital services from ICT and non-
ICT assets per hour worked to labor productivity growth are given for the periods
1980–1995 and 1995–2004. Two general trends stand out. First, in the most recent
period ICT capital is dominating non-ICT capital as a driver of  productivity growth.
On average, ICT capital contributes 0.8 percentage points to productivity growth
across all countries during 1995–2004, while non-ICT capital contributes only 0.2
percentage points. This might be surprising given the higher investment-to-value
added ratios in non-ICT as shown in Table 3, but due to the user-cost approach,
the rapid growth in short-lived ICT assets gets a relatively large weight. Still the
dominance of  ICT is not only due to an increase in the contribution of  ICT over
time, but to a general decline in the contribution of  non-ICT per hour worked in
many European countries. This dominance of  ICT as a contributor to growth is true




Major differences in the importance of  ICT for growth can be found across
countries, reflecting the long-run differences in ICT investments. While ICT capital




Arguably, market services growth in Spain is still heavily reliant on catching-up in non-ICT based technologies.
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the UK and the US, contributions are 0.5 percentage points or less in major conti-
nental countries such as France, Italy and Spain and there are no signs of  catching





 (2006) and Gust and Marquez (2004) suggest that part of
these cross-country differences in ICT investment are due to the impact of  different





 But much of  the cross-country differences remain unexplained.
 
3.3. The role of changes in labor composition
 
Another important input in market services which has attracted attention is the use
of  skilled labor. Technological change has been frequently characterized as skill-
biased, especially in knowledge-intensive sectors such as telecommunications, finance




 In Table 5 the shares of  high-skilled workers in
market services employment are given for 1980, 1995 and 2004 for our group of
countries (summed over the two other dimensions, gender and age). The table shows
that there has been a steady increase in the importance of  high-skilled workers over












See for a skill-taxonomy of  industries, Chapter 2 of  O’Mahony and van Ark (2003).
Table 4. Contribution of  ICT and non-ICT capital deepening to labor 





ICT-capital Non-ICT capital ICT-capital Non-ICT capital
Austria 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.0
Belgium 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.2
Denmark 1.4 0.2 1.4 –0.5
Finland 0.5 0.4 0.6 –0.7
France 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3
Germany 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6
Italy 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4
Netherlands 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.2
Spain 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7
UK 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.5
US 0.9 0.4 1.4 0.3
Average 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.2
Standard deviation 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4
Notes: The figures are a weighted average of  ICT and non-ICT capital deepening rates across nine market
services industries, where the weight is given by the share of  the industry in ICT or non-ICT capital
compensation.
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in Timmer et al. (2007).
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past two decades, suggesting an important role for growth in market services. Despite the
resurgence of  employment growth in continental Europe, the upward trend in the share
of  high-skilled labor has continued since the mid-1990s (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002).
This finding does not lend support to the popular notion that increases in employment
have led to an increase in the share of  low-skilled workers in market services. For
example, Blanchard (2004) suggested that labor productivity growth declines during
periods of  increased employment as it is based on employing low-skilled workers,
which were previously unemployed. However, the upward trend in the skill-content
of  the employees reflects the long-run impact of  investments made in the educational
systems as newcomers on the labor market have had on average more schooling than
the existing labor force. This pattern appears true for all service industries, with the largest
changes in knowledge-intensive industries like post and telecommunications and




As for the case of  capital, the productivity of  various types of  labor, such as low-
versus high-skilled labor, will differ and standard aggregate measures of  labor input,
such as number of  persons employed or hours worked, will not account for such
differences. In the growth accounting approach, it is assumed that the flow of  labor




The large cross-country differences in the share of  high-skilled labor in Table 5 may appear surprising. For example, this
share is much lower in Germany than in Spain, the UK or the US. This is due to the problem of  lack of  precise comparability
of  skill categories across countries. In the EU KLEMS database high-skilled workers are defined as those with college education
or above. However, educational systems within Europe and the US are very different. In particular the different role of
vocational schooling systems causes problems of  comparability across countries. For example, in Germany vocational training
is important to enter many occupations, but this is unknown in the US (see also Koeniger and Leonardi, 2007, p. 89). For time
series of  MFP in a country, it is most important, however, to use a consistent skill definition over time within each country. This
has been the primary aim in the EU KLEMS database. See Mason, O’Leary and Vecchi (2007) for a detailed comparison of
skill levels in major European countries.
Table 5. The share of  high-skilled workers in market services employment (%)
 1980 1995 2004
Austria 3.3 7.6 10.9
Belgium 6.7 12.0 15.5
Denmark 2.7 5.8 8.5
Finland 14.6 29.8 30.7
France 6.3 11.9 16.1
Germany 3.7 6.6 8.0
Italy 4.7 7.4 14.1
Netherlands 3.8 8.6 11.2
Spain 5.3 12.1 19.4
UK 8.0 12.8 18.0
US 19.4 26.9 30.6
Average 7.1 12.9 16.6
Standard deviation 5.2 8.1 7.8
Notes: High-skilled workers are defined as those with college education or above (see also footnote 16).
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in Timmer et al. (2007).
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their marginal productivities. The growth of  labor services is then given by the
growth rate of  hours worked by each labor type, weighted by its share in labor
compensation. Typically, a shift in the share of  hours worked by low-skilled workers
to medium- or high-skilled workers will then lead to a growth of  labor services which





3.4. Sources of labor productivity growth
 
Based on the developments in labor and capital input measures described above, a
decomposition of  labor productivity growth in market services industries into the
contribution of  factor inputs and MFP growth can be made (Table 6). The contributions
are given for each country for the periods before and after 1995. The table shows
that, for example, in France during the period 1980–1995 annual average labor
productivity growth was 1.9%. The increased use of  ICT capital per hour worked
contributed 0.4 percentage points to this growth. Similarly, non-ICT capital deepen-
ing and the changes in the labor composition contributed 0.4 and 0.5 percentage
points respectively. The remaining 0.6 percentage points of  labor productivity growth
were due to improvements in MFP.
Table 6 shows that during 1980–1995, changes in labor composition contributed
0.4 percentage points to labor productivity growth when averaged over all countries.
This contribution is mainly caused by an increase in the average skill levels of  the
employees. The contribution declined, but still remained positive after 1995 (0.2
percentage points on average). In both periods, changes in labor composition were
as important for growth as increases in non-ICT capital per hour worked. The
foremost conclusion to be drawn from this table is the importance of  investments in
fixed capital and human capital in driving labor productivity growth during both
periods. Averaged over all countries, investment in factor inputs almost fully
accounted for labor productivity growth in both periods and changes in MFP were,
on average, only minor.
However, when it comes to explaining differences in labor productivity growth
between countries, investments in human and physical capital are not of  much help.
As indicated by the standard deviations in Table 6, cross-country differences in labor
composition are generally too small to account for the divergence in labor productivity
growth and the same is true for non-ICT capital deepening. While the differences in
contributions from ICT are bigger, these can only explain part of  the observed




This difference is also known as ‘labor quality’ in the growth accounting literature (see e.g. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005).
However, this terminology has a normative connotation which easily leads to confusion. For example, lower female wages would
suggest that hours worked by females have a lower ‘quality’ than hours worked by males. Instead we prefer to use the more
positive concept of  ‘change in labor composition’.
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the highest investor (the US) and a lowest investor (Italy) explains 1.2 percentage
points out of  a labor productivity difference of  3.0% during 1995–2004. The remaining
1.8 percentage point difference is almost entirely due to the differences in MFP
growth between Italy and the US. Indeed cross-country differences in MFP growth





 not an important contributor to growth, it has by far the largest variation in
growth contributions, ranging from –1.2 percentage points in Spain, up to 1.3
percentage points in the US during the most recent period. In France, Germany
Table 6. Sources of  labor productivity growth in market services in Europe and 

















1980–1995      
Austria 2.1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7
Belgium 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.5 −0.4
Denmark 3.0 1.4 0.2 0.4 1.0
Finland 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.7
France 1.9 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
Germany 2.3 0.3 0.6 0.2 1.2
Italy 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 −0.3
Netherlands 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 −0.6
Spain 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.5 −1.0
UK 1.9 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.4
US 1.4 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.0
Average 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
Standard deviation 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7
1995–2004
Austria 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.2 −0.4
Belgium 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.4 −0.3
Denmark 0.9 1.4 −0.1 0.3 −0.7
Finland 1.7 0.6 −0.7 0.0 1.9
France 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1
Germany 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.0 −0.6
Italy 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 −0.6
Netherlands 2.4 0.8 0.2 0.1 1.3
Spain 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 −1.2
UK 2.5 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.4
US 3.3 1.4 0.3 0.3 1.3
Average 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1
Standard deviation 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.0
Notes: The figures are weighted averages of  growth rates of  inputs and outputs across nine market services
industries, where the weight is given by the share of  the industry in output or the costs of  the relevant input.
Labor productivity is defined as value added per hour worked. Input measures are on a per hour worked basis.
Figures might not add up due to rounding.
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in Timmer et al. (2007).
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and Italy, MFP growth is negligible or even negative. US growth rates of  MFP are
matched only in the Netherlands and Finland. Across all countries, the correlation
between labor productivity and MFP growth rates is higher than 80% for both
periods. This suggests that we need to focus on the determinants of  MFP growth in
trying to explain the recent variation in European labor productivity growth rates.
4. DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
In the previous section we showed how investment in physical capital and human
capital accounts for a substantial portion of  labor productivity growth in market
services in many countries. At the same time we found that cross-country differences
in labor productivity growth are mainly due to differences in the efficiency with
which the inputs are being used, as measured by MFP growth. To get further insight
into the causes of  MFP growth differences, we need to move beyond the growth
accounting framework and explain differences in MFP growth. In this section we will
use regression analysis to statistically gauge the importance of  a number of  potential
determinants of  MFP growth. For this purpose, we use a dynamic catching-up model
that is commonly used in the literature.14 Of  the many determinants, we will focus
here in particular on whether ICT use and the use of  skilled labor generates exter-
nalities and whether regulatory barriers to entry hamper productivity growth.
4.1. The basic model of productivity growth
Following the dynamic catching-up model, MFP growth in an industry is determined
by the strength of  the domestic innovation process and the speed of  imitation of  best-
practice technologies developed elsewhere.15 The potential for technology transfer is
captured by the technology gap relative to the global productivity leader. But the
social and technological capabilities of  an economy determine to what extent an
industry innovates and exploits imitation opportunities. Aghion and Howitt (2006)
argue that traditional European institutions were mostly suited for catching-up to
the technology frontier and not so much for fostering innovation. For example,
educational systems are more geared towards vocational schooling rather than higher
education, capital markets are biased towards large incumbent firms rather than
start-ups, labor market regulation promotes on-the-job training but hinders realloca-
tions across firms and innovation systems, including patent protection laws and public
R&D-institutes stimulate incremental innovation rather than major breakthroughs.
To capture this idea, additional variables reflecting these institutional differences
across countries are added to the model. Such variables might influence MFP growth
14 See e.g. Cameron et al. (2005), Griffith et al. (2004), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Vandenbussche et al. (2006).
15 Innovation is defined as the development of  technologies which are not only new to the country, but also new to the world.
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by affecting the pace of  innovation and the speed of  technology imitation. For exam-
ple, Griffith et al. (2004) find that spending on research and development (R&D) in
manufacturing industries increases the pace of  innovation but also speeds up technol-
ogy imitation.
The basic model to be estimated is then:
∆ ln MFP = β (Technology gap) + γX + δ (X * Technology gap) (1)
where X denotes one of  several possible determinants of  MFP of  policy interest. The
key parameters are β, which quantifies the importance of  technology imitation that
depends on the size of  the technology gap, γ which shows the direct effect of  X on
productivity growth, and δ which gauges whether X has a larger effect on productivity
growth for industries that are farther away from the frontier (positive sign) or closer
to the frontier (negative sign). The regressions will also include dummies to control
for fixed country-specific, industry-specific and time-specific factors.
In this section, we look at three possible determinants of  MFP growth, namely the
use of  ICT capital, the use of  university-educated workers and regulatory barriers to
entry as all three have been suggested as important drivers of  productivity growth.16
The latter two play a prominent role in the recommendations of  the Sapir Report
(2004). Our focus on market services precludes us from examining some other
explanatory variables which have been suggested, such as R&D and international
trade, as their role is much more limited in services than in manufacturing industries.17
4.2. Technology gaps
To implement our empirical model, measures of  technology gaps are a crucial ingre-
dient. In this paper, we follow standard practice and measure technology gaps as
MFP gaps even though MFP measures also reflect other factors besides technology
(see Box 1). In the case of  MFP gaps we need to measure the differences in output
levels between countries that cannot be accounted for by differences in the use of
inputs. The basic challenge of  measuring MFP gaps is similar to that for measuring
MFP growth. While the basic concept is fairly straightforward, the empirical
implementation in the literature varies substantially, with most studies using crude
productivity measures. In Table 7 we illustrate the difference between crude and
sophisticated MFP level measures and show how better measurement can change the
conclusions on technology leadership substantially. This will also have a major impact
on the analysis of  the determinants of  MFP growth in the remainder of  this section.
There are four main areas of  concern when calculating MFP gaps, namely the
measurement of  output, relative prices, employment and capital, mirroring the
16 See e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) on ICT, Vandenbussche et al. (2006) on university-educated workers and Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003) on barriers to entry. For more details, see, respectively, Sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5.






































Table 7. Relative MFP measures, averaged across market services industries, 1997, US = 1




Output measure Value added Value added Value added Value added Value added Gross output
PPP measure GDP PPP GDP PPP GDP PPP GO PPP GO PPP IO PPP
Employment measure Persons Hours Hours by type Hours by type Hours by type Hours by type
Capital measure Stock Stock Stock Stock Services Services
Austria 0.82 0.80 0.89 0.80 0.82 0.87
Belgium 0.82 0.95 1.01 1.01 1.05 1.09
Denmark 0.76 0.84 0.98 1.07 1.07 1.10
Finland 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.87
France 0.91 0.96 1.09 1.02 1.04 1.09
Germany 0.75 0.83 1.01 1.04 1.05 1.09
Italy 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.86
Netherlands 0.77 0.88 1.02 1.05 1.09 1.09
Spain 0.81 0.77 0.85 0.80 0.86 0.88
UK 0.79 0.80 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.97
US 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Notes: Each column shows the MFP level relative to the United States in 1997, averaged over the nine market services. MFP levels in column (1) are calculated by subtracting
the (cost-share weighted) relative levels of  persons engaged and capital stocks, from the relative level of  value added. All inputs and outputs are converted to a common currency
using OECD GDP PPPs for 1997. For column (2), total hours worked by all persons is used as the measure for employment. For column (3), hours worked by university-
educated and non-university-educated are distinguished and weighted using shares in labor composition. In column (4), industry-specific PPPs for industry gross output are
used for converting value added and capital stocks to a common currency. In column (5), six different capital assets are converted to a common currency using capital services
PPPs and weighted using shares in capital composition. In column (6), differences in relative prices for intermediate inputs are also taken into account and MFP levels are
calculated by subtracting the (cost-share weighted) relative levels of  hours worked by university- and non-university educated workers, capital services by six different capital
assets and 45 types of  intermediate inputs from the level of  output. All conversions to a common currency are made using industry- and input-specific PPPs. See Inklaar and
Timmer (2007b) for a more detailed description of  the last measure.
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discussion of  productivity growth measurement.18 First of  all, most studies compare
levels of  value added, implicitly ignoring the role of  intermediate inputs in the
production process. Second, the output in different countries can only be compared
once differences in relative prices are accounted for. This requires the use of  purchasing
power parities (PPPs). Many studies use GDP PPPs, since those are readily available,
but these reflect relative prices of  all goods and services in the economy. Here it is more
appropriate to use PPPs that reflect the relative prices of  output of  that particular industry.
Moreover, in this study we also take into account relative prices of  the various inputs.
When it comes to measuring labor input, some studies only measure the relative
number of  persons engaged while others also account for differences in average hours
worked across countries. It is preferable to measure differences in total hours worked
by different types of  workers as well, so as to account for differences in the composition
of  the workforce in different countries. Finally, most studies use a measure of  the
relative capital stock, but this does not adequately account for differences in the
composition of  capital input. Our detailed measure is based on a comparison of
capital service levels, accounting for asset heterogeneity.
Table 7 shows the relative MFP level of  each country, averaged across market services
industries in 1997. The first column, which we label ‘Crude MFP’, uses the least
sophisticated output, relative price and input measures. According to this productivity
measure, the US is the most productive country in market services. However, once the
necessary adjustments are made, five European countries show substantially higher
levels than the US. This is because input levels in US market services are higher than
indicated by the crude measures. Average hours worked in the US are generally much
higher than in Europe, as indicated by the differences between columns 1 and 2. Similarly,
skill levels in market services are higher in the US than in most European countries,
biasing the crude MFP level (column 3). Another downward adjustment to US levels
is made when moving from capital stocks to a measure including capital services,
which adjusts for the higher share of  ICT in the US as found in Table 3 (column 5).
Looking at the final column, labelled ‘Sophisticated MFP’, the US no longer has the
highest productivity level as about half  of  the European countries show higher MFP levels
in 1997. The example of  Germany is the most extreme: ‘Crude MFP’ shows Germany
with the lowest productivity level and a gap of, on average, 25% compared to the US,
while ‘Sophisticated MFP’ indicates that Germany is almost 10% more productive than
the US on average. The rankings of  MFP levels among European countries also shift
considerably once more sophisticated output and input measures are introduced. The
UK appeared to be leading Germany on the basis of  the crude measure, but especially
once corrections are made for longer hours worked and the relative high services output
prices in the UK, Germany is leading the UK on MFP in market services by a wide
margin in 1997. The adjustments can be even larger at a detailed industry level.19
18 Inklaar and Timmer (2007b) provides a more detailed and rigorous discussion of  these issues.
19 Not shown, but available upon request from the authors.
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As stressed before, Table 7 shows average levels across nine market services industries
and technology levels differ substantially across industries. Table A3 (at the end of  the
Appendix) shows the technology leader in each of  the nine market services industries,
as well as the numbers two and three, in 1980, 1995 and 2004. Looking across all
years, industries and countries, the average MFP level relative to the frontier is 69%,
suggesting that there is substantial potential for imitation of  frontier technologies.
Given the problems in the measurement of  services output volumes in some industries
(see Appendix 1) these numbers need to be interpreted with care. Level comparisons
are more sensitive to cross-country differences in measurement practices than growth
rate comparisons.
4.3. The impact of ICT use on MFP growth
Once the technology gaps have been measured, we can begin testing the importance
of  our potential explanatory variables for cross-country differences in MFP growth.
The first variable to be tested is ICT use. Since US labor productivity growth
accelerated after 1995, much effort has gone into determining the importance of  ICT
use and the lack of  acceleration in most other developed countries.20 ICT, like other
types of  fixed capital, contributes to labor productivity growth by increasing the
amount of  capital input per hour worked. In Section 3 we showed that ICT use
accounted for a major part of  labor productivity growth, under the assumption that
the benefits of  ICT capital are reflected by the price paid for its use. A more contentious
hypothesis is that ICT generates positive externalities, i.e. benefits that are higher
than the costs being paid by the investor. Such externalities could be caused by, for
example, network effects or complementary investments, such as organizational
change, that go unmeasured.21 The evidence on externalities from ICT use is mixed.
There is some firm-level and industry-level research for the US that suggests super-
normal returns to ICT, but a recent survey and meta-analysis concludes that the
hypothesis of  normal returns seems to hold (Stiroh, 2004).22 The evidence for coun-
tries other than the US is more scattered and these national studies are generally not
directly comparable.23 Using the EU KLEMS database, we can focus on MFP and
test for externalities of  ICT use across a larger group of  countries and industries. The
externalities should show up as a positive correlation between ICT use and MFP
growth as indicated in the model from Section 4.1.
20 See e.g. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Timmer and van Ark (2005).
21 See e.g. Stiroh (2002) and Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2004).
22 See e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) for a firm-level study and Stiroh (2002) and Basu, Fernald, Oulton and Srinivasan (2004)
for industry-level studies.
23 See OECD (2004) for a collection of  national studies. Basu et al. (2004) and O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) are among the
very few cross-country studies of  the productive impact of  ICT and find super-normal returns to ICT-use in the US, but not
in the UK. Some of  our own comparative analysis focused on labor productivity growth, making it hard to identify externalities,
or was of  a more descriptive nature. See van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2003) and Inklaar, O’Mahony and Timmer (2005).
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Table 8 shows the results of  this exercise. We first show a regression in which only
the technology gap is used to explain MFP growth. The technology gap is defined as
minus the log of  the relative MFP level, so that a larger gap equals a lower relative
level. Regardless of  whether we use crude or sophisticated MFP growth and level
measures, industries that are farther away from the technological frontier show faster
MFP growth. In the light of  the theoretical models discussed above, this might be
interpreted as the result of  international technology transfers, which benefit laggard
countries more than countries close to the frontier. This finding of  convergence of
MFP levels within service industries confirms earlier analysis by, for example, Bernard
and Jones (1996) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
The results in Table 8 show that the evidence of  the effects of  ICT on MFP growth
is mixed and depends on which measure of  ICT adoption is used. The growth of
ICT capital services is often used in the literature, but shows relatively little variation
across industries since global price declines of  ICT assets account for much of  this
growth.24 Moreover, the right-hand side of  Table 8 shows that using sophisticated
MFP measures actually shows a negative relationship between ICT use and MFP
growth. This would imply that the returns to ICT investments are lower than their
costs. However, this evidence is relatively weak. When we use our preferred measure
of  ICT adoption, which is the share of  ICT capital compensation in output, no such
effect is found as shown in columns 9 and 10.25 Similarly, there is also little evidence
to suggest that ICT has a differential impact depending on the size of  the technology
gap as indicated by the insignificant interaction effects in Table 8. As a result, our
cross-country analysis broadly confirms Stiroh’s (2004) finding for the US that ICT
assets are like other assets and earn their marginal product. This means that the
contribution of  ICT to labor productivity growth is well approximated by the growth
accounting method applied in Section 3. ICT externalities do not explain the cross-
country differences in MFP growth.
4.4. The impact of human capital on MFP growth
Skilled labor has also been suggested as another driver of  technological change and
an important source of  productivity growth. Recently, Vandenbussche et al. (2006)
presented a model where economies with a larger share of  university-educated
workers exhibit a faster rate of  innovation, because skilled labor has a comparative
advantage for innovation compared to imitation. Hence the growth-enhancing effect
of  skilled labor will be stronger for economies closer to the frontier as the opportunities
for growth through imitation decrease. Vandenbussche et al. (2006) present cross-country
24 See Inklaar and Timmer (2007a).
25 In Appendix 4, we provide further robustness exercises. There we show that allowing for a longer time-horizon as in
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) and also advocated by O’Mahony and Vecchi (2005) does not change the results. We also show
that the evidence for a negative relationship is found in only some industries and countries and that these negative coefficients






































Table 8. The relationship between technology gaps, ICT use and productivity growth
Dependent variable: 
MFP growth
Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Technology gap 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.014** 0.020*** 0.021***
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
ICT use (growth of  ICT)  −0.020 −0.050**    −0.024*** −0.038***   
  (0.015) (0.023)    (0.009) (0.012)   
ICT use (cost-share in ICT)    −0.042 −0.102    −0.053 −0.034
    (0.049) (0.083)    (0.035) (0.056)
Technology gap*ICT use   0.057**  0.120   0.038  −0.033
(0.029) (0.111) (0.024) (0.089)
Number of  obervations 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376
Notes: The table shows OLS regression estimates, explaining annual MFP growth by the technology gap relative to the frontier, measures of  ICT use and the interaction between
the technology gap and ICT use. *, ** and *** denote a coefficient significantly different from zero at, respectively, the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors, consistent for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. For definitions of  crude and sophisticated MFP, see Table 7. The industry-level data are a balanced panel for 9 market
services industries in each of  the 11 countries for the period 1980–2004 and all regressions include country, industry and year dummies. See Appendix 4 for robustness analysis.
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evidence supporting this model and their study has subsequently been used in the
Sapir Report (2004) to support the policy argument that higher education stimulates
innovation. Their finding of  skill externalities is all the more important because in an
earlier study, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) conclude that while there is a high private
return to education, the evidence for externalities at the level of  industries or aggregate
economies is far from conclusive.
However, the study by Vandenbussche et al. (2006) has two important drawbacks. First,
growth differences between countries are only analyzed at the aggregate level, instead
of  across industries within countries, which leaves open the possibility that the positive
correlation between human capital and MFP growth is due to a country-specific factor
that is correlated with both human capital and growth.26 The second drawback is that
they rely on crude MFP measures that do not take into account differences in hours
worked or in the educational attainment of  the labor force. This means that their analysis
cannot make a distinction between private and social returns to education. Only findings
of  social returns (or externalities) would provide a solid basis for policy initiatives.
In Table 9, we show that while the use of  crude MFP measures provides a weak
confirmation of  the Vandenbussche et al. (2006) results, when using sophisticated
MFP measures, the positive correlation between human capital and MFP growth is
absent. In the left panel, we replicate the set-up by Vandenbussche et al. (2006), using
aggregate economy data, no country fixed effects and crude MFP measures. Columns
1 and 2 show a significant positive effect of  high-skilled workers on MFP growth. The
interaction term also has a negative sign as predicted by the model of  Vandenbussche
et al. (2006), but is not significant. However, the positive effect of  the share of  high-
skilled workers disappears once sophisticated MFP measures are used as shown in
columns 3 and 4. In Appendix 4, we show that correcting the crude MFP measures
for differences in hours worked and differences in the composition of  the workforce
causes the significant positive effect to vanish. In other words, Vandenbussche et al.
(2006) are only estimating the private return to education, which is in part transferred
to MFP growth due to measurement issues. In the right-hand panel, we redo the
analysis for our set of  nine market services industries. The industry-level estimates are
consistent throughout and do not provide evidence that a larger share of  high-skilled
workers has an impact on MFP growth.27 Our results for the use of  skilled labor are
therefore similar to those for ICT use: there is no evidence of  productivity externalities
from employing university-educated workers. As for ICT, this means that the contribution
of  a higher-educated workforce to labor productivity growth is well-captured in the
growth accounting exercise from the previous section.
26 See Temple (2000) for a more extensive discussion of  the problem with cross-country growth regressions. This possibility is
not entirely dispelled by the fact that the positive correlation between human capital and MFP growth disappears once taking
into account country fixed effects.
27 In Appendix 4 we show further robustness results, namely the results for all six MFP measures, results using different
measures of  the high-skilled share, including those from the same source as Vandenbussche et al. (2006), and different sets of










































Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Technology gap 0.027** 0.044** 0.015* 0.007 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020***
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
High-skilled share 0.043** 0.065** 0.004 −0.009 −0.017 −0.034 −0.019 −0.017
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.016) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023)
Technology gap*High-skilled share −0.106  0.056  0.050  −0.006
  (0.126)  (0.121)  (0.038)  (0.034)
Number of  observations 264 264 264 264 2376 2376 2376 2376
Notes: The table shows OLS regression estimates, explaining MFP growth by the technology gap relative to the frontier, the share of  high-skilled (university-educated) workers
in total hours worked and the interaction between the technology gap and the high-skilled share. *, ** and *** denote a coefficient significantly different from zero at, respectively,
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are in parentheses. For definitions of  crude and sophisticated MFP, see Table
7. The total economy data are a balanced panel for 11 countries, while the industry-level data are a balanced panel for 9 market services industries in each of  the 11 countries,
all of  these for the period 1980–2004. The total economy results include year dummies and the industry-level results include country, industry and year dummies. See Appendix
4 for robustness analysis.
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4.5. The impact of regulatory barriers to entry on MFP growth
Analyzing the effect of  competition on productivity growth has taken great flight in
recent years (see e.g. Aghion and Griffith, 2005 and Crafts, 2006 for overviews). The
outcome of  recent theoretical work is that more competition in product markets
stimulates productivity growth because it stimulates innovation. Moreover, this effect
might be stronger when an industry is closer to the technology frontier as those
industries need to rely more on innovation compared to imitation.28 Testing this prediction
is not straightforward as competition in product markets cannot be observed directly.
In some cases, changes in the regulatory regime can be used as a proxy for changes
in competition. For example, Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006) use information
on the implementation of  the European Single Market Programme in different years
and different countries and assuming a stronger effect in some manufacturing industries
than others to establish that deregulation improved productivity growth in manufacturing
by stimulating spending on R&D. Eventually, the liberalization of  market services that
is mandated in the EU Services Directive may provide a similar testing ground for
the effects of  regulation on productivity growth in market services.
In the meantime, the product market regulation measures compiled by the OECD
are the most useful for the purpose of  measuring the impact of  regulation on productivity.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) described the OECD Product Market Regulation
Database measures in detail and provide the first systematic empirical analysis of  the
impact of  regulation on productivity in a cross-country setting.29 Their study has been
highly influential and has been another source of  inspiration for the Sapir Report
(2004). Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find some evidence that entry liberalization in
services increases productivity growth, which supports the theoretical notion that
entry barriers decrease the intensity of  competition. Paradoxically, they find an
impact of  deregulation in services on productivity growth in manufacturing industries,
but not in services industries.30 In this section, we will further explore the link
between deregulation and productivity growth by focusing on market services
industries only, and zooming in on individual services industries for which long-run
data on entry liberalization exist. One might expect that due to the heterogeneity in
regulatory changes, evidence of  an impact might only be found at a detailed industry
level. With the EU KLEMS database such a detailed industry study is feasible.
We provide two analyses: one based on a regulation index averaged across all
services industries, in the spirit of  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), and one based on
industry-specific regulation indices. Table 10 shows that there is no effect of  the
average level of  barriers to entry in services on MFP growth in market services
28 See e.g. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) for such a model.
29 Conway and Nicoletti (2006) present updates of  their indicators for non-manufacturing industries.
30 In Table 8, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) report a significant impact of  entry liberalization in services on productivity growth
across all industries. However, in Table 7 they showed that this entry liberalization trend in services did not significantly affect






































Table 10. The effect of  barriers to entry on productivity growth in market services
Dependent variable: MFP 
growth
Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Technology gap 0.027*** 0.020** 0.016 0.050** 0.019*** 0.009 0.009 0.010
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Barriers (average) 0.011 0.006   0.000 −0.004   
 (0.011) (0.012)   (0.007) (0.007)   
Barriers (industry-level)   −0.024** −0.002   −0.010 −0.009
   (0.011) (0.014)   (0.007) (0.010)
Barriers*Technology gap  0.010  −0.052**  0.015  −0.002
  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.017)
Number of  observations 2376 2376 715 715 2376 2376 715 715
Notes: Dependent variable in the regressions is annual MFP growth in market services industries, independent variables are the technology gap of  the industry relative to the
productivity frontier and measures of  barriers to entry from the OECD and their interaction. ** and *** denote a coefficient significantly different from zero at, respectively,
the 5% and 1% level. Standard errors, consistent for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, are in parentheses. For definitions of  crude and sophisticated MFP, see Table 7.
Average barriers to entry uses an average index of  barriers to entry, calculated by averaging across the entry barriers indices of  all non-manufacturing industries for which the
index is available for the 1980–2003 period, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006). Industry barriers to entry uses industry-specific entry barriers indices for retail (1996–2003),
transport and storage (1980–2003, output-weighted average of  road, rail and air transport), post and telecommunications (1980–2003 output-weighted average of  post and
telecommunications) and professional services (1996–2003).
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industries. Moreover, this finding does not depend on the MFP measure that is used
(columns 2 and 6).31 There are also no significant interaction effects. This confirms
the results of  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). One reason for this finding might be
that entry liberalization occurred in different industries at different times, so using the
trend averaged over industries may miss the relevant variation in the data. In the
remaining columns of  Table 10, we look at the effect of  industry-specific barriers to
entry on MFP growth. Unfortunately industry-specific data are more limited and
only available for four industries, but the results seem more in line with theoretical
predictions: all coefficients are negative, although only significant if  crude MFP meas-
ures are used (column 3). The mixed nature of  the results may be due to the fact that
there is insufficient change over time in the barriers to entry in some industries. For
example, in most countries, barriers to entry in retail trade hardly changed in the
period for which data are available. To identify the effects of  barriers to entry, an even
more detailed focus on an industry with more variation in the regulatory measures
might be needed.
Table 11 attempts this by looking at barriers to entry in two individual industries:
transport and storage services and post and telecommunications services. For both
industries, the OECD constructed a time series of  barriers to entry covering our
entire sample period from 1980 onwards and both industries experienced substantial
entry liberalization in most countries.32 This is most strongly so in post and telecom-
munications, which changed during the 1990s from a very restrictive to an almost
fully liberalized industry environment in nearly all countries.33 Table 11 shows that
there is little effect of  changes in barriers to entry in the transport industry, but in
post and telecommunications, lower barriers are strongly related to higher MFP
growth, even when sophisticated measures are being used (columns 7 and 8).34 This
finding provides support for the notion that lower barriers to entry promote productivity
growth by increasing competition.
These results also raise the question of  why we do not find such strong results for
transport and storage. One possibility is that the change in barriers to entry for the
post and telecommunications services was so strong that its effects became identifiable
through the general noise in the data, while this was not the case in transport. An
alternative explanation might be that the barriers to entry measure in transport is an
average of  a quite heterogeneous set of  regulations, since it covers barriers to entry
in rail, road and air transport. The summary OECD measures of  regulation may not
capture all the complexities of  product market regulation and their interaction with
31 Nor does it depend on the period covered, results are available on request. See also Appendix 4 for further tests using average
trends as well as indirect measures of  regulation as used by Conway et al. (2006).
32 The OECD publishes indicators for road, rail and air transport and for postal services and telecommunications. We use
output weights to construct weighted averages of  these individual series.
33 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006) on the trends and also Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) on regulation and performance in
telecommunications.
34 Appendix 4 probes the robustness of  this result by looking at different sets of  dummies, different periods and alternative






































Table 11. The effect of  barriers to entry on productivity growth in transport and communications
Dependent variable: 
MFP growth
Transport and storage Post and telecommunications
Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP Crude MFP Sophisticated MFP
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Technology gap 0.203*** 0.427*** 0.115*** 0.128*** 0.075*** 0.041 0.077*** 0.068***
 (0.072) (0.131) (0.035) (0.041) (0.025) (0.034) (0.023) (0.023)
Barriers −0.022 0.056* −0.012 −0.007 −0.056*** −0.130*** −0.041*** −0.060***
 (0.021) (0.034) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.039) (0.012) (0.021)
Barriers*Technology gap  −0.334***  −0.011  0.091**  0.037
  (0.118)  (0.014)  (0.044)  (0.029)
Number of  observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
Notes: Dependent variable is MFP growth in the transport industry or the telecommunications industry. All regressions include country and year dummies. For further notes,
see Table 10.
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labor market regulation and fine-grained industry-specific regulations such as, for
example, land-zoning in retailing, accounting standards in business services or
sanitation requirements in the hotel business.35 Finally, it might be the case that
regulatory barriers to entry in post and telecommunications represent a larger part
of  the overall entry barriers, which will also include fixed start-up costs, than in
transport.36 These possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, but in general
point to the importance of  detailed regulatory and productivity measures to analyse
the impact of  regulation on productivity.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Over the past decade, much of  Europe has missed out on productivity growth
opportunities in market services. While growth surged in the US and some European
countries, like Finland and the UK, most countries in Europe show slow and declining
productivity growth in market services. Compared to the manufacturing sector, rela-
tively little is known of  the sources of  labor productivity growth in market services.
In this paper, we provide the most comprehensive evidence to date on the sources of
growth by using the new EU KLEMS database. This database provides detailed
information on outputs, inputs and productivity at the industry level for European
countries and the US.
The first part of  our analysis showed that investment in new technologies (ICT)
and human capital have contributed substantially to growth across Europe and the
US. Some European countries, like Denmark and the UK, show contributions from
ICT use that are comparable to those in the US, while others, such as Italy and
Spain, show much lower contributions. However, differences in investment rates of
ICT and human capital cannot account for the cross-country differences in labor
productivity growth in market services. Instead, the differences in the rate of  efficiency
gains, also referred to as multifactor productivity (MFP) growth, are as pronounced
as the differences in labor productivity growth.
To arrive at these conclusions, we relied on a growth accounting methodology.
This method assumes, amongst other things, that there are no productive externalities
to the use of  inputs. However, investors in ICT may for example benefit from network
effects, while a large pool of  skilled laborers might have a positive impact on the
overall innovation process. We systematically analyze these possibilities but find no
evidence in support of  such externalities. This contradicts one of  the key conclusions
from the Sapir Report (2004). We show that the reason for this is that an analysis
based on crude productivity data cannot distinguish between the private and social
35 See Baily and Kirkegaard (2004) and Crafts (2006) on some of  these considerations. Also see Kox and Lejour (2005) on the
impact of  differences in regulation across countries.
36 See also the discussion in the Sapir Report (2004, p. 37), in particular on the distinction between fixed-line and mobile
telephony.
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returns to education. When this distinction is made, it appears that externalities
cannot explain the differences in MFP growth. Since we do not find externalities to
the use of  ICT and university-educated workers, the case for government intervention
in stimulating the diffusion of  ICT or a preferential treatment of  higher education
vis-à-vis primary and secondary schooling is not supported by our analysis.
We also look at the impact of  regulatory barriers to entry in services, since high
barriers are likely to dampen the intensity of  competition in the product market and
hence, reduce the incentives for innovation. We find limited evidence in support of
this hypothesis: MFP growth in post and telecommunications benefited substantially
from entry liberalization during the 1990s. This supports the view that deregulation
fosters productivity, but since we could not find similar evidence for other industries,
the evidence suggests caution in the formulation of  policy recommendations. For
further insights, we need more detailed data on services regulation measures and a
better understanding of  how regulation affects competition in services. However, our
analysis does not reject the notion that a decline in entry barriers in services may
unlock the productivity growth potential of  other market service industries provided
that substantive action in this area is undertaken. Since various service industries have
recently been liberalized within individual countries, cross-border liberalization, as
envisaged in the EU Services Directive, is a natural way forward to gain productivity
advantages in services across Europe.
A few cautionary notes are in order. First, while we find that, by and large, output
measures of  services tracks the ‘true’ performance of  the sector reasonably well, there
is substantial scope for improvement, especially for output measures for the financial
and business services industry. Convergence towards best measurement practices and
a higher degree of  transparency by national statistical offices should help to inspire
more confidence in the official statistics. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in
productivity performance across market services and pooling these industries together
in econometric analysis might not be warranted. Some of  the market industries are
as large as the total manufacturing sector and differ greatly in the degree of  openness
to international trade, foreign direct investment and intensity of  formal R&D. Our
findings of  significant results from deregulations on MFP growth in post and telecom-
munications confirm that industry heterogeneity should be explicitly recognized in
growth analysis.
Finally, when discussing multifactor productivity trends in services, it is important
to take a broad view of  ‘technology’. While one might equate ‘technology upgrading’
with the introduction of  new vintages of  machinery, formal R&D and other hard
science, in particular in manufacturing, the concept of  technology as used in economic
theory is actually much broader and therefore also applicable to services. ‘Technology’
describes the available knowledge about the various ways in which inputs, such as
capital and labor, can be combined in the production of  goods and services (Hulten,
2001). For service industries in particular, this may be more strongly related to
changes in organizational structure, management and work practices than ‘hard’
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technological changes. These types of  technology might less easily spillover from one
firm to another than manufacturing technologies, as they are embodied in company
and management cultures. In fact, for a study of  services a re-examination of  the
mechanisms through which technologies transfer from laggard to frontier countries
seems needed. With the exception of  recent work by, for example, Bloom and van
Reenen (2006), measurement of  the importance and transfer of  intangible assets
across countries, is still an underdeveloped field.37 Integrating new measures and
insights from both industry-level and micro-level research can be another important
line of  research that should provide further explanations for why productivity growth
rates in market services have diverged across Europe and the US, as well as provide
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In this paper the authors provide the first detailed analysis of  market services produc-
tivity across European countries and the US using the newly assembled EU KLEMS
database. The database is now available for other researchers and the current paper
will stimulate a rich vein of  research. The paper is motivated by the difference in the
aggregate performance of  the US and European countries in labor productivity
growth since 1995. It investigates the role that MFP growth – as opposed to factor
accumulation – played in that difference and the possibility that externalities to ICT
or human capital investment or differences in product market regulation can account
for it. In my comment I will put into sharper focus a number of  aspects of  the data
that emerge from their analysis. I begin by summarizing the case presented by the
authors, point to some gaps in the case and highlight some of  the issues associated
with the new level estimates of  MFP.
A way of  bringing out the role of  MFP performance in accounting for the differences
in labor productivity growth between European countries and the US since 1995 is
presented in Figure 2. This shows the decomposition in the productivity growth
shortfall to the US in the 1995–2004 period into the four components of  ICT and
non-ICT capital deepening, the change in labor composition and MFP growth. I
have ordered the countries in the figure according to the percentage contribution of
MFP growth to explaining the shortfall to US labor productivity growth. Three countries
illustrate the variation in experience. At the far right of  the MFP columns, is the UK
where more than the entire labor productivity growth deficit relative to the US in this
37 See Black and Lynch (2005) for an overview of  measuring organizational capital.
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period is accounted for by weaker MFP growth: ICT investment was also weaker
whilst non-ICT investment and labor composition changes were stronger than in the
US. Interestingly as Table 6 in the paper shows, MFP growth in the UK slowed down
slightly between 1980–1995 and 1995–2004 in contrast to its rapid acceleration in
the US. At the opposite end of  the spectrum is Finland where MFP growth in the
post-1995 period was faster than in the US (shown by the negative bar) – whereas
factor accumulation was weaker. The Netherlands is also interesting because its
productivity growth shortfall is mainly accounted for by weaker ICT investment:
MFP growth was at the same rate as in the US.
The core of  the analysis in the paper is centred on the estimation of  a dynamic
catching up model where MFP growth is a function of  a catch-up term (the β
coefficient), the candidate growth factors, which are ICT, human capital and regulation,
(the γ coefficients) and the interaction between the growth factors and the technology
gap (the δ coefficients). The model is motivated by the hypothesis that there are
potentially differential effects on productivity growth in industries that are close to
the technology frontier as compared with their effects on industries far from it. For
example, higher education is predicted to have a positive direct (frontier) effect but
be less important for catching up, which would be captured by a negative interaction
effect. Regulatory barriers are predicted to depress MFP growth at the frontier
(negative γ ) and to have a more detrimental effect for industries closer to the frontier
(positive δ ).
The predictions are tested using the disaggregated industry data for market services
over the period from 1980 to 2004. Across a wide range of  specifications, there is
clear evidence of  MFP convergence to the technology leader. However, there is no
evidence that ICT investment or an increase in the proportion of  university educated
Figure 2. Decomposing the labor productivity growth shortfall to the US, 
1995–2004
Source: Table 6 in this paper.
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workers has a direct effect on the rate of  technological progress (the frontier effect)
or that its effects depend on the technology gap. The results on human capital stand
in contrast to those for the aggregate economy reported by Vandenbussche et al.
(2006). Inklaar et al. demonstrate that the source of  the difference between their
results and those of  Vandenbussche et al. lies with their corrections to the MFP
measures – in particular their corrections in the measured labor inputs for changes
in hours worked and in skill composition. Their claim is that once inputs are measured
correctly, there is no additional impact of  either ICT or higher education on MFP
growth. This finding is of  considerable policy relevance since if  it is valid, the heavy
emphasis in recent European debates on the likely innovation benefits from government
policies to promote higher levels of  investment in ICT and higher education would
be misplaced – at least in so far as it applies to market services.
The authors find a little more support for the argument that regulatory barriers
affect MFP – but only in one industry, post and telecommunications. However, they
do not find any support for the presence of  an interaction effect whereby lowering
barriers has a greater effect in boosting productivity growth in industries closer to the
frontier.
In view of  the considerable investment in data collection and in the creation of
sophisticated measures of  MFP and given that the initial results using these measures
do not provide clear support for policies that are being promoted in Europe, it is
important to think carefully about the construction of  the MFP measures and to look
at what the measures reveal. The most striking finding is that contrary to the impression
given by the paper’s motivation, the author’s calculations show that the US is not the
technology leader as measured by ‘sophisticated’ MFP in market services. In 1980,
the US was the MFP leader in none of  the nine market services industries and ranked
second in two. By 2004, the US led in one industry and was second in one. Table 12
lists the first three countries in each of  the market services industries according to the
Table 12. MFP leaders by market services industry: 1980 and 2004
1980 2004
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Motor trade Belgium Denmark UK Belgium Netherlands Finland
Wholesale Belgium Germany UK Germany Netherlands Finland
Retail Denmark Belgium Germany Denmark Germany France
Hotels & Rest. France Germany Denmark Austria Germany US
Transport Netherlands UK US Netherlands US France
Post & Telecomm. UK US Belgium France Germany UK
Fin. Intermediation Italy UK US Italy Belgium Denmark
Bus. Services UK US Spain US Belgium Denmark
Social & personal Netherlands Austria Denmark France Netherlands Germany
Source: Table A3, at the end of  the Appendix.
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authors’ preferred measure of  MFP. There are several surprising aspects of  the data:
first is the limited presence of  the US as technology leader either at the beginning or
the end of  the period, second is the apparently remarkably good performance of  the
UK in 1980 just as the Thatcher reforms were being launched, and third is the
premier position of  Italy as productivity leader in financial services.38
The analysis in the paper reveals that the world looks quite different when viewed
through the lens of  the more sophisticated measures of  productivity. The corrections
make a substantial difference both to the cross-country levels and to growth rates.
Figure 3 shows that although the US is the leader in a bench-mark year (1997) when
the crude measure of  MFP is used, five European countries have higher MFP after
the various adjustments have been made. This difference is due mainly to correcting
for the quality of  labor input (US inputs are higher than are captured by ‘persons’)
and to implementing double deflation using industry level PPPs. In the right hand
panel of  Figure 2, which shows the data for the post-1995 period, it is clear that in
moving from the crude to the sophisticated measure of  MFP, relative growth rates are
also affected. There are big downwards adjustments for the US, UK and Denmark
and upward adjustments for Germany and Italy. The substantial productivity growth
advantage of  the UK over Germany virtually disappears when the more sophisticated
measure is used.
To sum up, the paper by Inklaar et al. produces results about the determinants of
productivity growth in market services that are somewhat at odds with prevailing
views in the European debate – in particular, they do not find that ICT or higher
education are important for MFP growth either directly or differentially for industries
close to or further from the technology frontier. They find some support for the role
38 The most recent OECD Economic Survey of  Italy (2007) provides a summary of  evidence of  inefficiency relative to other
OECD countries in the Italian financial services industry (pp. 74–75).
Figure 3. The effect of  more sophisticated measurement of  MFP on country 
rankings in levels and growth rates.
Source: Table 7 in the paper and Table A2 in the Appendix.
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of  regulatory barriers in the post and telecommunications industry but not more
generally. As I have illustrated, the sophisticated measures of  MFP levels and growth
rates that they derive are also somewhat puzzling: in contrast to the motivation of  the
paper and much of  the debate in Europe, the data reveal that it is not European
countries but the US that is lagging in productivity levels in most industries
throughout the period. Although the authors point out that the problems with cross
country comparability in measurement are greater for levels than for growth rates,
nevertheless the levels play a key role in the econometric analysis (via the catch-up term).
Taken at face value, these productivity indicators suggest that if  Europe is already ahead
in MFP in most market services industries, its problem needs to be reformulated.
Alternatively, the results may indicate that further thought is needed in checking
that the sophisticated MFP measure accounts for all relevant factors. Two possible
confounding factors come to mind. The first relates to the assumption of  competitive
factor and product markets – the example of  the top ranking of  the Italian financial
intermediation industry is suggestive that rents may be being captured in the MFP
measure. Second, the measure of  human capital that is used may be too narrow, with
the result that some of  it is included by default in measured MFP. Inklaar et al. use
the share of  university graduates in labor input as the high skill measure. If  this omits
a substantial proportion of  vocationally qualified high-skill workers in some countries,
it may lead to an overestimate of  MFP levels in such countries. The authors are aware
of  this potential problem but point out that the data to deal with it are not generally
available. To indicate that the problem exists we focus on four countries for which
much more detailed comparable human capital data are available (US, UK, France
and Germany). We can then compare the ranking of  the level of  high-skill human
capital that Inklaar et al. use with the ranking based on the richer classification
(Mason et al. 2007; cited by Inklaar et al.). Whereas Germany ranks fourth and France
third of  these four countries in Inklaar et al.’s measure of  the human capital content
of  market services, Germany ranks first in each market services industry and France
second in more than half  of  them in Mason et al.
Jonathan Temple
University of Bristol
This paper uses a new dataset, created as part of  the EU KLEMS project, to analyze
productivity in Europe, and especially the productivity of  market services. The main
aims of  the empirical analysis are (1) to describe and compare productivity levels and
growth rates in market services in the US and 11 European economies; (2) to examine
the role of  information and communication technologies in service sector productivity
growth; and (3) to explain the differences between the EU, where growth in the
service sector has often been slow, and the US, where it has often been fast.
The construction of  the dataset is a major and valuable contribution in itself, and
one that will enable some important research questions to be addressed. The current
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paper already shows how to make constructive and informative use of  the new data.
In discussing the paper’s empirical analysis, there are two sets of  points I would like
to make: one set narrowly statistical, and the other more general.
The statistical points relate to the use of  convergence ideas in the empirical models.
Some of  the models estimated in the paper, such as those in Table 8, relate growth
in multifactor productivity (MFP) to the extent of  international technology gaps. In
the paper’s models, these gaps are defined as minus the log of  the relative MFP level,
so that a larger gap corresponds to a lower relative MFP level. The paper estimates
the relationship between growth and technology gaps using pooled regressions, based
on data on 11 countries and 9 market services sectors. The empirical findings are
modified slightly when the authors use their new series for relative MFP, rather than
cruder ones.
In estimating a relationship between growth and initial conditions, this exercise
bears a family resemblance to the conditional convergence regressions used in the
literature on aggregate economic growth. As elsewhere in the sector-level work on
productivity, there is probably more to be learnt from the cross-country growth literature
than first meets the eye. First, given that the implied rates of  convergence are rela-
tively low, one issue is whether tests of  this kind can distinguish genuine convergence
from cases where relative MFP is not mean-reverting. Second, it would be interesting
to consider the possible implications of  measurement error for the estimates. This is
especially so, given that a major contribution of  this paper is the construction of  new
and more sophisticated MFP series, which should be more accurate than those pre-
viously available.
To see why this is relevant, it is worth considering the relationship between meas-
urement error and convergence. Investigations of  convergence are essentially asking
whether today’s outcomes are strongly or weakly related to past outcomes. A weak
association corresponds to a faster rate of  convergence. Put differently, if  units like
countries or sectors are converging to steady-states quickly, this means that the influ-
ence of  the initial conditions must be dissipating quickly. It is then easy to see what
can happen under measurement error. Since the errors in the data will weaken the
association between today’s outcomes and past outcomes, they will tend to bias the
results towards faster convergence. This effect has been discussed in De Long (1988)
and Temple (1998).
If  we look at the results in Table 8, the move from the basic MFP series to the
more sophisticated series lowers the estimated rates of  convergence. This pattern is
appealing, because it is the one we should expect, if  the MFP data constructed by the
authors genuinely contain less (classical) measurement error than the more basic
data. There would be several ways of  exploring this further. In principle, it would be
possible to use instrumental variables, method-of-moments corrections, or carry out
reverse regressions, as in Temple (1998). Until the literature on sector-level produc-
tivity acknowledges the possibility of  measurement error in more detail, some of  its
findings on convergence should be treated with caution.
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The second point I want to make is about the underlying economics. The empirical
analysis in the paper points towards an interesting research question, which is why
differences in services MFP across countries might persist. Perhaps part of  the
explanation lies in productivity differences across firms within a given country. Many
services involve significant scope for quality differences, and output that is non-
standardized: think of  architects, for example. These characteristics have implications
not only for measurement, but also for market structure, because they could allow
firms of  widely-varying productivity to co-exist even in equilibrium. It could be argued
that the service sector has exactly the combination of  sunk costs (through reputation-
building) and ex ante uncertainty about productivity that leads to equilibrium
productivity differentials in Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003).
This suggests, for future research, an interesting explanation for international
differences in service sector productivity. Differences across countries may be strongly
influenced by the extent to which productivity varies within each country: for example,
those countries with a long tail of  weak performers will have lower average productivity.
In turn, this perspective could shed new light on product market regulation and
competition policy. There might be scope for investigating these questions with
KLEMS data, or perhaps more obviously, with data at a more disaggregated level.
These ideas hint at the way that better data can invite deeper research questions
and provide a firmer basis for policy analysis. Whether or not these specific ideas can
be easily pursued, the authors deserve great credit for putting together such a useful
dataset, and for analyzing it to such good effect.
Panel discussion
Philippe Aghion remarked that the paper’s results are hard to reconcile with recent
contributions finding that ICT or human capital or institutional structures account
for cross-country differences in productivity. While the literature hotly debates which
of  these factors may be more relevant, this paper finds that none of  the standard
factors accounts for productivity differences, and this is puzzling. Peter Schott pointed
out that comparisons of  labor input quality across countries are very imprecise, and
wondered whether firm-level data may be more informative in the relevant respects.
Stephen Redding suggested that firm-level data might indeed be useful for the purpose
of  assessing the relationship between export activity and productivity, and that data
on multinational firms could help disentangle firm and country effects. Anne Sibert
pointed out that since the role of  ICT is more important when reorganization is
easier, interactions between ICT and possibly different measures of  regulation (such
as land-use restrictions in the case of  retail trade) should play a key role.
Francesco Caselli found it very striking that, according to the paper’s results, so
many countries appear to have experienced many years of  negative productivity
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growth. He wondered whether composition effects may spuriously produce such
evidence as countries reallocate factors between different value-added sectors within
services industries, or perhaps negative measured productivity growth could be due
to adjustment or adoption costs. Christian Schultz noted that the tightness of  labor
markets might influence such aspects. Werner Sinn added that public employment
could also be relevant: in the public sector, production is essentially measured on the
basis of  wages, which may not be appropriate for the purpose of  assessing welfare-
relevant productivity developments. Daria Taglioni thought that the output of  services
sectors is indeed generally difficult to measure, even in the private sector, and that
the implications of  measurement difficulties for the paper’s results could be assessed
considering their different relevance for different manufacturing sectors, many of
which have a large services component.
APPENDIX 1. OUTPUT MEASUREMENT IN MARKET SERVICES
Market services productivity trends are much less studied than trends in manufacturing.
A major reason for this is the concern about the availability of  adequate measures of
services output and productivity, often referred to the overviews of  measurement
issues by Griliches (1992, 1994). It is well-known that the problem of  measuring
output is in general much more challenging in services than in goods-producing
industries. Indeed, Griliches (1994) classified a large part of  the services sector as
‘unmeasurable’.39 Most measurement problems boil down to the fact that service
activities are intangible, more heterogeneous than goods and often dependent on the
actions of  the consumer as well as the producer. While the measurement of  nominal
output in market services is generally less problematic, being mostly a matter of
accurately registering total revenue, the main bottleneck is the measurement of  output
volumes, which requires accurate price measurement adjusted for changes in the
quality of  services output.40
There is no doubt that problems in measuring services output still exist, but many
statistical offices have made great strides forward in the measurement of  the nominal
value and prices of  services output.41 Still, progress has been uneven, both across
industries and countries.42
To provide an assessment of  statistical practices in European countries, we have
made use of  a series of  recent surveys of  volume measurement practices by national
39 See also Sichel (1997) for the likely impact of  these ‘unmeasurable’ industries and Wölfl (2003) for an extensive general
overview of  measurement issues in services.
40 A prominent exception to measurement problems for nominal output is for banking, see Wang, Basu and Fernald (2004).
41 See, for example developments in the US Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) (Horrigan, Bathgate and Swick, 2006). Triplett
and Bosworth (2004) discuss the long-term improvements made in the US statistical system on measuring services. The
Voorburg Group on Service Statistics, which was set up in 1986, has brought together statisticians from national statistical
institutes around the world, including Europe, to review and improve methods concerning the measurement of  services (see
http://www4.statcan.ca/english/voorburg/2004-background.htm).
42 In a study of  measurement practices in the UK, Crespi et al. (2006) argue that measurement problems in the UK are most
severe in finance and business services.
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statistical institutes (NSI’s) in the European Union. These inventories were mandated
by Eurostat. Using the Eurostat (2001) Handbook on Price and Volume Measures in National
Accounts, NSI’s have graded their volume measurement techniques in each industry
as an A, B or C-method. An A-method is considered as most appropriate, a B-
method as an acceptable alternative to an A-method, and a C-method as a method
that is too biased to be acceptable, or one that is conceptually wrong. For example,
for business and management consultancy services, an A-method would be the col-
lection of  actual or model contract prices and such prices need to account for changes
in the characteristics of  the contracts over time. A typical B-method could be the use
of  charge-out rates or hourly fees for business services or the price index of  a closely-
related activity, such as accounting or legal services. A C-method would be any other
deflation method, such as using the overall CPI or PPI (Eurostat, 2001, pp. 107–108).
The inventories by the NSI’s referred to above describe the state of  measurement
practices in each country around the year 2000. Most countries gave explicit grades
for each industry and where possible, we cross-checked this grading with the description
in the Handbook.43 Table A1 shows the share of  output in each industry that is
deflated using A, B and C-methods, averaged across those European countries in our
dataset for which these inventories were available. The table shows that measurement
practices in market services are far from perfect since A-methods, with the exception
of  hotels and restaurants, account for only a small share of  output in most industries.
It also shows that measurement is most problematic in finance and business services,
43 In a number of  cases, the grades were adjusted to better conform to the Handbook. For some countries, coding was missing
and had to be done based on the given description of  measurement practice.
Table A1. Average share of  value added in market services in European countries 
deflated using A, B or C-methods around the year 2000 (%)
ISIC rev3 code Industry A B C
50 Motor trade 0 78 22
51 Wholesale trade 0 78 22
52 Retail trade 0 78 22
55 Hotels and restaurants 73 20 8
60–63 Transport and storage 9 70 21
64 Post and telecommunications 1 86 13
65–67 Financial intermediation 0 54 46
71–74 Business services 6 47 46
90–93 Social and personal services 16 47 37
 Average 12 62 26
Notes: Classification into A, B and C-methods are by national statistical offices, based on Eurostat (2001). A-
method is defined as most appropriate, B-method as acceptable and C-method as unacceptable. Average share 
is calculated based on information for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and the UK. For each country and each industry we use information on the share of  value added deflated using
A, B or C-methods, and for each industry (as well as the total average) these shares are averaged across
countries.
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where nearly half  of  output is deflated with C-methods. As might be expected, there
is also substantial variation in measurement across countries, but generally hotels and
restaurants are best measured and finance and business services are worst measured.
However, it also becomes clear that the scope of  measurement problems should not
be overstated: on average about a quarter of  output is deflated using inappropriate
(and thus potentially misleading) deflators while for the remainder, at least acceptable
methods are used. For example, Inklaar and Timmer (2007c) provide an analysis of
how B-method deflation in retail trade compares to a conceptually superior alternative
(A-method). They conclude that while more appropriate deflation leads to somewhat
different growth rates of  output and productivity, the broad pattern of  growth
differences across countries (which is what matters for this study) is not strongly
affected.
A few notes of  caution are in order here. First, the inventories of  measurement
practices reflected the situation around the year 2000 and it is not known to what
extent new practices are carried through in revisions of  historical time series published
by the statistical offices. Second, while the best measured and worst measured service
industries are the same across countries, there is still substantial variation. For example,
in one (small) European country the share of  C-methods is 77%, while in another
country, this share is only 5% compared to an average share of  C-methods of  26%.
This suggests that convergence to best measurement practice within Europe would
already allow for a more accurate assessment of  productivity growth in market services.
This would not so much require additional conceptual work, but more effective
adoption of  best practices among NSI’s (see also Crespi et al., 2006). In general,
researchers and other users would benefit substantially from more openness and
transparency by NSI’s about measurement practices. The unpublished, confidential
and infrequent measurement inventories in Europe stand in sharp contrast to easily
accessible publications as published in the Survey of  Current Business of  the US Bureau
of  Economic Analysis, which regularly reports on updates in the methodologies used
in constructing the US National Accounts.
APPENDIX 2. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Growth accounting set-up
To assess the contribution of  the various inputs to aggregate economic growth, we
apply the growth accounting framework as developed by Jorgenson and associates
(see, for example, Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005). It is based on production possi-
bility frontiers where industry gross output is a function of  capital, labor, intermediate
inputs and technology, which is indexed by time, T. Each industry, indexed by j, can
produce a set of  products and purchases a number of  distinct intermediate inputs,
capital service inputs, and labor inputs to produce its output. The production functions
are assumed to be separable in these inputs, so that:
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Yj = fj (Kj, Lj, Xj, T ) (A1)
where Y is output, K is an index of  capital service flow, L is an index of  labor service
flows and X is an index of  intermediate inputs, either purchased from domestic industries
or imported. Under the assumptions of  competitive factor markets, full input utilization
and constant returns to scale, the growth of  output can be expressed as the (cost
share) weighted growth of  inputs and multifactor productivity (denoted by AY ):
(A2)
where vi denotes the two-period average share of  input i in nominal output and vL +
vK + vX = 1. Each element on the right-hand side indicates the proportion of  output
growth accounted for by growth in intermediate inputs, capital services, labor services
and MFP, respectively. By dividing through total hours worked and rearranging, the
breakdown of  value added per hour growth can be made as follows:
(A3)
where w i denotes the two-period average share of  input i in nominal value added.
This formulation allows us to assess the contribution of  capital deepening (capital
services per hour worked) and labor composition change (labor services per hour
worked) to labor productivity growth.
Growth accounting decompositions are made on the basis of  certain restrictive
assumptions such as cost-minimizing producers and competitive factor and product
markets. These are unlikely to be fully satisfied in practice, but growth accounting
provides a straightforward, non-parametric and consistent method which can be used
as a starting point to identify the contributions of  inputs and productivity to growth.
It can also serve as a benchmark as most economy policy frameworks are nowadays
focused on creating an economic environment that more or less satisfies the free-
market conditions. In Section 4 we found no evidence that the growth accounting
assumptions on the returns to skills and ICT capital had to be rejected.
Data sources
The data for this paper are taken from the first version of  the EU KLEMS database
(March 2007). This database is publicly available at www.euklems.net. This is a new
database which provides measures of  economic growth, productivity, employment
creation, capital formation and technological change at a detailed industry level for
European Union member states, Japan and the US from 1970 onwards. It has been
put together by a consortium of  sixteen research institutes across Europe in close
cooperation with National Statistical Offices and is financed by the European
Commission. The database is specifically designed to provide all data necessary for
growth and level accounting exercises as described in the main text.
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The EU KLEMS database provides long time-series going back to 1970 through
linking of  national account data series from different vintages in a harmonized and
consistent way. National Account series are further subdivided into the necessary
industry, labor and capital detail on the basis of  additional secondary data sources.
For example, industry detail in output and employment series is increased by additional
information from industry surveys. To have a breakdown of  various labor categories,
use is made of  additional surveys, such as Labor Force Surveys, which are available
on an annual basis for most countries. For a breakdown of  investment into various
asset types, additional information from input–output tables and investment surveys
was used. Especially series on investment in computers and communication equipment
are normally not provided in the National Accounts. Further detail on the sources
and methods used for each country can be found in Timmer et al. (2007a).
The database has a number of  unique characteristics compared to other existing
multi-country industry-level databases such as the OECD STAN database. Specifically,
the EU KLEMS database contains measures of  gross output, intermediate inputs,
labor service input and capital services input at the level of  30 industries (of  which 9
are market service industries). Hours worked are cross classified by age (3 types),
gender (2 types) and educational attainment (3 types). Labor services input is meas-
ured by weighting hours worked by each of  the eighteen types of  labor in a Törnqvist
aggregation procedure, where weights are given by the share of  each type in total
labor compensation. Thus, the changes in the composition of  the labor force are
taken into account which is important as in most countries, the share of  more productive
higher-skilled workers is increasing, albeit at different speeds. Similarly, changes in the
composition of  the capital stock are taken into account by distinguishing six asset
types at the industry level (see below for the measurement of  capital stocks and
services). This is the first time that labor and capital services measures are available
at an industry-level for a wide range of  countries.
Importantly, output and input measures in EU KLEMS are harmonized across
countries in various ways. This includes harmonization of  industrial classifications
and harmonization of  classifications for labor types and capital assets. But also the
measurement of  capital stocks was harmonized by using similar assumptions concerning
the depreciation model (which is a perpetual inventory model with geometric depre-
ciation rates) and depreciation rates (which vary by asset type and industry but not
by country).44 As investment prices of  IT-hardware are not quality-adjusted in all
countries, we use the harmonization procedure introduced by Schreyer (2002) to
adjust for differences in deflation measures (see Box 2 in main text).
44 Although depreciation rates most likely vary across countries due to differences in the pace of  structural change, there is no
empirical evidence available which can be used to model this. Assuming identical rates across countries is a second-best solution.
The rates are based on the rates used by the BEA in the US national accounts (Fraumeni, 1997).
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Growth of capital services
According to the perpetual inventory model (PIM), the capital stock (S) is defined as
a weighted sum of  past investments with weights given by the relative efficiencies of
capital goods at different ages:
(A4)
with Si,T the capital stock (for a particular asset type i ) at time T, ∂i,t the efficiency of
a capital good i of  age t relative to the efficiency of  a new capital good, and Ii,T−1 the
investments in period T – t.45 As in the work of  Jorgenson et al., a geometric depreciation
pattern is applied (Fraumeni, 1997). With a given constant rate of  depreciation δi
different for each asset type, we get , so that:
(A5)
If  one assumes that the flow of  capital services from each asset type i (Ki ) is
proportional to the average of  the stock available at the end of  the current and the
prior period (Si,T and Si,T−1), one can aggregate capital service flows from these asset
types as a translog quantity index to:
(A6)
where weights are given by the average shares of  each component in the value of
capital compensation 
The estimation of  the compensation share of  each asset, vi, is related to the user
cost of  each asset. The user cost approach is crucial in any analysis of  the contribution
of  ICT capital to growth, because the annual amount of  capital services delivered per
euro of  investment in ICT is much higher than that of  an euro invested in, say,
buildings. While an ICT asset may typically be scrapped after five years, buildings
may provide services for decades. ICT assets have a high user cost due to high
depreciation and declining prices. For example, the user cost of  IT-machinery is
typically 50 to 60% of  the investment price, while that of  buildings is less than 10%.
Therefore one euro of  IT capital stock gets a heavier weight in the growth decomposition
than one euro of  building stock. This different weight on capital services is picked up
by using the rental price of  capital services,  which reflects the price at which the
investor is indifferent between buying or renting the capital good for a one-year lease
in the rental market. In the absence of  taxation the equilibrium condition can be
rearranged, yielding the familiar cost-of-capital equation:
45 An important implicit assumption made here is that the services by assets of  different vintages are perfect substitutes for each
other.
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(A7)
with rT representing the nominal rate of  return, δk the depreciation rate of  asset type
k, and  the rate of  inflation in the price of  asset type k.46 This formula shows that
the rental fee is determined by the nominal rate of  return, the rate of  economic
depreciation and the asset specific capital gains.
The nominal rate of  return is determined ex post (endogenous approach). It is
assumed that the total value of  capital services for each industry equals its compensation
for all assets. This procedure yields an internal rate of  return that exhausts capital
income and is consistent with constant returns to scale. This nominal rate of  return
is the same for all assets in an industry, but is allowed to vary across industries, and
derived as a residual as follows:
(A8)
where the first term  is the capital compensation in industry j, which under
constant returns to scale can be derived as value added minus the compensation of  labor.
Growth of labor services
As for capital, the productivity of  various types of  labor, such as low- versus high-
skilled labor, will differ across these types. Standard measures of  labor input, such as
number of  persons employed or hours worked, will not account for such differences.
Hence it is important that measures of  labor input take account of  the heterogeneity
of  the labor force in measuring productivity and the contribution of  labor to output
growth. In the growth accounting approach, these measures are called labor services,
as they allow for differences in the amount of  services delivered per unit of  labor. It
is assumed that the flow of  labor services for each labor type is proportional to hours
worked, and workers are paid their marginal productivities. Then the corresponding
index of  labor services input L is given by
(A9)
where ∆ ln Hl,t indicates the growth of  hours worked by labor type l and weights are
given by the period average shares of  each type in the value of  labor compensation.
In this way, aggregation takes into account the changing composition of  the labor
force. We cross-classify labor input by educational attainment, gender and age (to
46 The logic for using the rental price is as follows. In equilibrium, an investor is indifferent between two alternatives: earning
a nominal rate of  return r on an investment q, or buying a unit of  capital collecting a rental p and then selling it at the
depreciated asset price (1 − δ )q in the next period. Assuming no taxation the equilibrium condition is: (1 + rT)qi,T−1 = Pi,T + (1 −
δi)qi,T, with P as the rental fee and qi the acquisition price of  investment good i ( Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000, p. 192). Rearranging
yields a variation of  the familiar cost-of-capital equation: Pi,T = qi,T−1rT + δiqi,T−1 − [qi,T − qi,T−1], which when dividing the rental
fee by the acquisition price of  the previous period transforms into equation (A4).
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proxy for work experience) into 18 labor categories (respectively 3 * 2 * 3 types). Typically,
a shift in the share of  hours worked by low-skilled workers to medium- or high-skilled
workers will lead to a growth of  labor services which is bigger than the growth in
total hours worked. We refer to this difference as the labor composition effect.47
Series on hours worked by labor types are not part of  the core set of  national
accounts statistics put out by NSIs, not even at the aggregate level. Also, there is no
comprehensive international database on skills which can be used for this purpose.
Previous cross-country studies relied on rough proxies of  skills such as distinguishing
production versus non-production workers as in Griffith, Redding and van Reenen
(2004) or combined a wide variety of  disconnected sources such as in Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2003). More in-depth country studies such as Koeniger and Leonardi
(2007) use consistent data for wages and employment by skill from one particular
source. This is also the strategy followed in EU KLEMS. For each country covered,
a choice was made for the best statistical source for consistent wage and employment
data at the industry level. In most cases this was the labor force survey (LFS), which
in some cases was combined with a earnings survey when wages were not included
in the LFS. In other instances, an establishment survey, or social-security database
was used.48 Care has been taken to arrive at series which are consistent over time.
This involved significant additional effort, as most employment surveys are not
designed to track developments over time, and breaks in methodology or coverage
frequently occur.
Level accounting set-up
Comparing productivity levels across countries is in many ways analogous to com-
parisons over time. However, while one typically compares productivity in one year
with productivity in the previous year, there is no such natural ordering of  countries.
Therefore the comparison should not depend on the country that is chosen as the
base country. There are various index number methods that can be used to make
multilateral comparisons. We use the method suggested by Caves, Christensen and
Diewert (1982). This index mirrors the Törnqvist index approach used in our growth
accounting, but all countries are compared to an artificial ‘average’ country (AC).
This average country is defined as the simple average of  all N countries in the set.
For example, a multilateral index of  capital service input in country c is given by:
(A10)
47 This difference is also known as ‘labor quality’ in the growth accounting literature (see e.g. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 2005).
However, this terminology has a normative connotation which easily leads to confusion. For example, lower female wages would
suggest that hours worked by females have a lower ‘quality’ than hours worked by males. Instead we prefer to use the more
positive concept of  ‘labor composition’.
48 See Timmer et al. (2007a).
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with  and vj,c the share of  asset type j in total nominal capital
compensation in country  the average compensation share of  capital
asset j over all countries N and  the average stock of  asset j. This
mirrors equation (A6). Similar indices can be constructed for labor services inputs
and intermediate inputs. Gaps in multi factor productivity levels can be derived by
subtracting the compensation-weighted relative inputs from relative output as follows
(industry and time subscript suppressed for convenience):
(A11)
with v’s the input shares in gross output averaged between country c and the average
country AC. A comparison between two countries, say Germany and the US, can be
made indirectly: by first comparing each country with the average country and then
comparing the differences in German and US levels relative to the average country.49
Output and input PPPs
A level accounting approach to output and productivity comparisons has not been
widely applied, which is primarily due to the lack of  adequate industry-specific PPPs
for output and inputs. PPPs are needed to adjust output and inputs for differences in
relative price levels between countries. This is true, even when countries have a
common currency unit, such as the euro. For example, when the price of  a haircut
is 10 euro in Portugal against 15 euro in Germany, the Portuguese price level is 67%
of  that in Germany and this should be taken into account.50 This price adjustment is
often done by means of  GDP PPPs (Purchasing Power Parities) which reflect the
average expenditure prices in one country relative to another. GDP PPPs are widely
available through the work of  the OECD and Eurostat. However, it is well-recognized
that the use of  GDP PPPs, which reflect expenditure prices of  all goods and services
in the economy, can be misleading when used to convert industry-level output. For
example, Bernard and Jones (2001) stated that ‘. . . research is needed to construct
conversion factors appropriate to each sector and that research relying on international
comparisons of  sectoral productivity and income should proceed with caution until
these conversion factors are available’ (p. 1169). Until recently, no comprehensive set
of  industry-level PPPs was available. As an alternative, some studies resorted to the
use of  ‘adjusted’ expenditure prices as a proxy for prices for industry output (see e.g.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). In this paper we make use of  a new and comprehensive
49 Note that the same assumptions as for the growth accounts underlie the level accounts. In particular the assumption of
constant returns to scale might be less plausible when comparing countries rather than developments over time. This might be
important if  one wants to argue that low productivity in services in Europe is in part driven by lack of  economies of  scale. This
can only be tested through a parametric exercise which is outside the scope of  this paper. If  economies of  scale are important
at the country level then the measured productivity levels of  small countries are underestimated.
50 Engel and Rogers (2004) found a significant dispersion in prices in the euro area countries, even after introduction of  the euro.
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dataset of  industry PPPs for 1997, in combination with a benchmark set of  Supply
and Use tables. PPPs for value added are constructed by double deflation of  gross
output and intermediate inputs within a consistent input–output framework. In addi-
tion, relative price ratios for labor and capital input are developed. For a full discus-
sion of  the new industry output PPPs, the reader is referred to Timmer, Ypma and
van Ark (2007b). For the integration of  gross output PPPs and the derivation of  input
PPPs in a level accounting framework, details are spelled out in Inklaar and Timmer
(2007b). Below we only present the most important elements of  our methodology.
PPPs for gross output are defined from the producer’s point of  view and are at
basic prices, which measures the amount received by the producer for a unit of  a
good or service produced. These PPPs have partly been constructed by way of  unit
value ratios for agricultural, mining, manufacturing and transport and communica-
tion services. For other industries, PPPs are based on specific expenditure prices from
Eurostat and the OECD, which are allocated to individual industries producing the
specific item. The value was adjusted from expenditure to producer level with relative
transport and distribution margins and by adjusting for differences in relative tax
rates. Margins and tax rates were derived from benchmark supply and use tables for
1997. This set of  gross output PPPs for 1997, covering 45 industries at (roughly) 2-
digit industry level, has been made transitive across countries by applying the multilateral
EKS-procedure for a total of  26 countries.51 For this study the gross output PPPs were
then aggregated to the 26 market industries used in this study.
Intermediate input PPPs should reflect the costs of  acquiring intermediate deliveries,
hence they need to be based on purchasers’ prices. Assuming that the basic price of
a good is independent of  its use, we can use the same gross output PPP for a particular
industry, after adjustment for margins and net taxes, to deflate all intermediate
deliveries from that industry to other industries. The aggregate intermediate input
PPP for an industry is then derived by weighting its intermediate inputs at the gross
output PPPs from the delivering industries. Imports are separately identified for
which exchange rates are used as PPP, hence assuming no price differences across
countries for imported commodities.
To obtain PPPs for capital and labor input, we follow the methodology outlined
by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978). The PPP for capital services is based on the
expenditure PPP for investment from Eurostat and the OECD, adjusted for differences in
the user costs between countries. The user cost of  capital input depends on the rate
of  return to capital, the depreciation rate and the investment price change. These
data are taken from the capital accounts discussed above. The procedure to obtain a
PPP for labor is more straightforward than for capital as it simply involves aggregating
relative wages across different labor types using labor compensation for each type as
weights. For this purpose we only distinguish between two labor categories: workers
51 These include 25 OECD countries and Taiwan.
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with a university degree or higher, and those without. This limited number of  skill
types is due to difficulties in matching schooling systems across the various countries.
APPENDIX 3. CRUDE AND SOPHISTICATED MFP MEASURES
The growth accounting methodology has been theoretically motivated by the seminal
contribution of  Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) and put in a more general input–
output framework by Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987).52 However, the empirical
implementation of  this methodology for European countries has been scarce. Despite
the publication of  an OECD handbook on productivity measurement (Schreyer,
2001), which is based on the growth accounting methodology, national statistical
institutes (NSIs) have been slow in adopting this methodology and to date, only one
European NSI, i.e. Statistics Denmark, has published MFP-measures on a regular
basis.53 The OECD and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre maintain
MFP series for aggregate OECD economies, but not at the industry level with the
exception of  a single study by Inklaar et al. (2005) including four European countries
(France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).54 Because of  the lack
of  useful statistics, various scholars have put together ad-hoc databases mostly for the
purpose of  one single study. The estimates were often based on the OECD Structural
Analysis database, STAN (and its predecessor the International Sectoral Database–
ISDB) which provides industry-level series on output, aggregate hours worked and
aggregate capital stock for a limited group of  countries and years. However, MFP
measures based on these aggregate concepts of  inputs can be seriously biased as will
be shown in this appendix. This is unfortunate, given the increased demand and use
of  industry-level growth accounting statistics for evaluating a wide range of  policy
areas, including for example outsourcing and international trade, educational policies,
investment tax credits and innovation policies. More broadly, MFP statistics are used
to study the effects of  regulation of  product-, labor- and capital-markets on economic
growth and inequality. Finally, MFP measures are a crucial ingredient in growth
projections used by central banks to set monetary targets.55
In Table A2 we indicate that using more sophisticated input measures is not only
conceptually appealing, but also leads to measures of  MFP which can be radically
different from cruder measures which have been used in previous studies. The first
column in Table A2 indicates ‘crude’ MFP growth rates averaged over the period
1995–2004 for each country. The crude measure is calculated by subtracting the
weighted growth in persons engaged and growth of  the capital stock from growth in
52 See Jorgenson (1995) and Hulten (2001) for an overview.
53 Several European NSIs are experimenting with growth accounting statistics, including Statistics Netherlands, Statistics Swe-
den, Statistics Finland and ISTAT (the Italian NSI).
54 For OECD series, see www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/39/36396940.xls. For GGDC series, see www.ggdc.nl/dseries/growth-
accounting.shtml, described in Timmer and van Ark (2005).
55 See e.g. Koeniger and Leonardi (2007), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Griffith et al. (2004), Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and
Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2007).
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value added volumes.56 This crude measure is used for example by Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir (2006) and Färe et al. (2006). In the remaining columns, the
ingredients for an adjustment of  the MFP measure are constructed in a sequential
procedure. Each column shows the additional effect on MFP growth rates by taking
into account an improvement in a particular input measure. Subsequently, we show
the effects of  taking into account changes in average hours worked (as e.g. in Nicoletti
and Scarpetta, 2003), changes in labor composition (as e.g. in Griffith, Redding and
van Reenen, 2004; Cameron, Proudman and Redding, 2005), changes in capital
56 An additional issue for the growth accounting decomposition not discussed so far, is the calculation of  the weights in equations
(A2) and (A3). As each input should be weighted by its share in total costs, most studies typically take the compensation of
employees as the weight for labor input. However, the labor input weight should also reflect the costs of  labor for self-employed.
Especially for industries with a large number of  self-employed such as retailing, hotels and restaurant and some business services,
the share of  self-employed can be up to 15 percent. We adjust labor compensation by the ratio of  total persons engaged over
employees, implicitly assuming that self-employed have a wage similar to employees. The weight of  capital is defined as gross
value added minus our measure of  labor compensation. This will include taxes on production.
Table A2. Sensitivity of  MFP growth in market services to different input and 




















Austria 0.2 0.0 −0.2 −0.1 0.1 −0.1
Belgium 0.6 0.0 −0.3 −0.7 0.4 −0.1
Denmark 0.6 −0.2 −0.3 −1.0 0.4 −0.4
Finland 1.9 0.1 0.1 −0.1 −0.8 1.3
France 0.9 0.4 −0.4 −0.1 −0.4 0.5
Germany 0.1 0.7 0.0 −0.1 −0.2 0.4
Italy −0.5 0.2 −0.1 0.2 0.2 −0.1
Netherlands 1.7 0.4 0.0 −0.2 −0.9 0.9
Spain −0.6 0.0 −0.4 −0.2 0.7 −0.6
UK 1.5 0.3 −0.4 −0.3 −0.5 0.5
US 2.0 0.1 −0.3 −0.2 −0.6 1.0
Notes: Column (1), labelled ‘Crude’, calculates MFP growth by subtracting the (cost-share weighted) growth in
persons engaged and the capital stock from growth of  value added at constant prices. Figures show average MFP
growth for the nine market services for the period 1995–2004. Column (2) shows the effect of  accounting for
changes in average hours worked by persons engaged. Column (3) shows the effect of  accounting for changes
in the composition of  the workforce (distinguishing workers based on education, age and gender). Column (4)
shows the effect of  accounting for changes in the composition of  capital (distinguishing six types of  capital assets).
Both composition adjustments recognize that workers with higher wages and capital assets with higher user costs
should have a higher marginal product. Column (5) shows the effect of  accounting for differences in the use of
intermediate inputs. Column (6), labelled ‘Preferred’, calculates MFP growth by subtracting the (cost-share
weighted) growth in hours worked by different types of  workers, different types of  capital and intermediate inputs
from growth of  gross output at constant prices. It is equal to the sum of  columns (1) through (5).
Source: Calculations by authors on EU KLEMS database, March 2007 (http://www.euklems.net), described in
Timmer et al. (2007).
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composition and accounting for intermediate inputs. By summing up the MFP effects
from the four adjustments, our preferred estimate in the last column of  Table A2 is
derived from the crude MFP estimate.57
The overall adjustments made to the crude MFP estimate vary considerable across
countries and we find no clear cross-country pattern in the bias. Our preferred
estimate is up to 1.0 percentage point lower than the crude estimate for Denmark,
the UK and the US, but up to 0.4% higher in Italy and Germany. For example, while
on the basis of  the crude measures annual US MFP growth is 1.9% higher than in
Germany, our preferred estimate indicates a growth advantage of  0.6%. However,
although no clear biases can be detected in the overall combined adjustments, the
individual component adjustments often have predictable effects. Accounting for
changes in hours worked (column 2) leads to higher MFP growth rates in all countries
(except Denmark) as hours worked per worker are still declining across Europe. The
adjustments for changes in labor composition are often negative, as there is a general
shift towards higher-skilled and more experienced workers. The most important
adjustment is the shift from a capital measure based on aggregate stocks to capital
services. As shown in the main text, the importance of  short-lived ICT assets relative
to non-ICT assets has increased over time. Consequently, capital service input growth
rates are higher than capital stock growth rates in all countries (except for Italy). The
final adjustment from a value added based MFP measure to a gross output based
MFP measure shows no effect in a particular direction. If  value added volume growth
is measured as a weighted growth rate of  gross output and intermediate input volumes,
MFP measured for gross output and MFP as measured for value added are
proportional to each other depending on the ratio of  gross output over value added
as the factor of  proportion.58 This factor will differ across countries, and over time.
For example, there is a general tendency towards using more intermediate inputs,
especially business services, as firms outsource many of  the standardized service
activities. This leads to an increase in the ratio of  intermediates over gross output
which should be accounted for. As can be seen from column (5), this adjustment
differs across countries without a clear pattern.
Obviously, our preferred measure is still imperfect as it does not deal with other
adjustments which are needed such as changes in capital capacity utilization (which
is especially important for short-run analysis), imperfect competition, intra-industry
deliveries and intangible capital. The latter refers to the need for including intangible
capital measures such as R&D knowledge and organizational capital into the input
measures. These adjustments are beyond the scope of  the current study, but point to
avenues for further research (see e.g. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006) on the
measurement of  intangibles).
57 Note that the preferred MFP estimate in this table differs from the one shown in Table 6. While the MFP measure shown
here is based on the gross output basis, the one in Table 6 is on a value added basis, see main text.
58 See Bruno (1984), Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) or Schreyer (2001) for an extensive discussion.
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